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## CLASSIC AND ROMANTIC TRENDS IN PLATO<sup>1</sup>

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The problem of the One and the Many is a problem essentially Platonic. Characteristically Platonic is the saying of Socrates in the *Phaedrus*: "If I find any man who is able to see a 'One and Many' in nature, him I follow, and 'walk in his footsteps as if he were a god.'" <sup>2</sup> The problem of the One and the Many may indeed be said to be the point around which Plato's deepest concerns center. It occurs in most of his dialogues. It appears in different formulations, and it receives a variety of emphasis. It is certainly at the root of his morals. "Not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued," <sup>3</sup> is Plato's fundamental teaching. And the good life is a life of law, order, justice. The diverse elements of the soul must be set in order; they must submit to one organizing principle; they must become a well-ordered unity. "Can there be any greater evil," asks Socrates, "than discord and distraction and plurality where unity ought to reign? or any greater good than the bond of unity?" <sup>4</sup> The ethical task of the many is "to grow up in a noble order"; <sup>5</sup> they must constitute "one entirely temperate

<sup>1</sup> An address before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, February 23, 1917.

<sup>2</sup> *Phaedrus*, 266 (Jowett's translation).

<sup>3</sup> *Crito*, 48.

<sup>4</sup> *Republic*, 462.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* 421.

and perfectly adjusted nature";<sup>6</sup> they must, like a work of art, become fashioned into "a regular and systematic whole."<sup>7</sup> The many are to become one, be the many the multiple elements of the individual soul or the plural citizens of the State. For Plato advocates no "double standard"—one for the individual and another for the group. "The just man," insists Socrates, "will be like the just State";<sup>8</sup> "the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the individual";<sup>9</sup> and "the States are as the men are."<sup>10</sup> This problem of the One and the Many is no mere ethical problem for Plato. His whole metaphysical quest is a quest for absolute essences behind the multiplicity of appearances. "Philosophers only are able," Socrates informs Glaucon, "to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not philosophers."<sup>11</sup> It is the task of philosophy to seek behind "the many and variable" for the absolute and eternal and immutable reality "not varying from generation and corruption." The doctrine of ideas, subject indeed to many and variable interpretations, must be regarded as Plato's metaphysical account of the nature of reality. "This universe," according to his belief, "is . . . Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule."<sup>12</sup> That ultimate reality, despite appearances, possesses eternal harmony, absolute permanence, essential unity—this is the Platonic conviction formulated in the doctrine of ideas.

The search for unity then may in general be affirmed to be Plato's supreme speculative endeavor. What kind of unity is Plato seeking? Here we come upon a question which admits of no simple answer. I find in Plato two conflicting conceptions of unity. Whether they are with or without consistency maintained by him I am not prepared to discuss. To reconcile them, or to re-

<sup>6</sup> Republic, 443.<sup>7</sup> Gorgias, 504.<sup>8</sup> Republic, 435.<sup>9</sup> Ibid. 441.<sup>10</sup> Ibid. 544.<sup>11</sup> Ibid. 484.<sup>12</sup> Gorgias, 508.



duce one to the other, is a task for the specialist who is committed to defend the unity of Plato's thought. I am no Plato scholar, and I have no ready hypothesis which will explain the differing modes of his doctrine. That the dialogues actually contain two inconsistent notions of unity, however the professional Platonist may interpret them, can be demonstrated by quotations from the text. Their inconsistency may indeed be superficial or even specious; nevertheless they seem to me to represent two fundamentally different attitudes toward life and reality. And because I think it important to note the distinction between them, I venture, with all due apologies to Plato and the Platonists, to call attention to these seemingly conflicting views.

One conception of unity found in Plato is a *unity which is antagonistic to the many*. Variety, difference, change, complexity are excluded from it. The immortality of the soul, for instance, is argued by Plato from such a notion of unity. "We cannot believe," asserts Socrates in the tenth Book of the *Republic* "—reason will not allow us— . . . the soul, in her truest nature, to be full of variety and difference and dissimilarity. . . . The soul . . . being . . . immortal, must be the fairest of compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements."<sup>13</sup> In the notion of *uncompounded unity* lies Plato's chief guarantee for the eternal existence of the soul. In the *Phaedo* Socrates formulates the argument thus: "The compound or composite may be supposed to be naturally capable, as of being compounded, so also of being dissolved; but that which is uncompounded, and that only, must be, if anything is, indissoluble. . . . And the uncompounded may be assumed to be the same and unchanging, whereas the compound is always changing and never the same."<sup>14</sup> And it is such argument which leads to the conclusion that "the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and

<sup>13</sup> *Republic*, 611.

<sup>14</sup> *Phaedo*, 78.

immortal and intellectual and uniform and indissoluble and unchangeable.”<sup>15</sup> Although this notion of the soul affords perhaps the most striking example of Plato’s view of an “uncompounded unity,” this same view is also at the basis of his doctrine of ideas. “Tell me,” Socrates asks of Meno, “tell me what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular into a plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing, but deliver virtue to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces.”<sup>16</sup> In the *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and elsewhere the ideas are looked upon as being self-contained and transcending *internal* multiplicity and variety and change. What relation the ideas have to one another is a different question. But the ideas *quâ* ideas—the ideas of beauty, of justice, of goodness—are absolute and permanent, possessing a reality and dignity other than that of the flux of particulars. Socrates satirizes “the gentleman who is of opinion that there is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty—in whose opinion the beautiful is the manifold—he . . . your lover of beautiful sights, who cannot bear to be told that the beautiful is *one*, and the just is *one*, or that anything is *one*.”<sup>17</sup> The true lover of knowledge, on the contrary, “will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only.”<sup>18</sup> But “those who see the many beautiful and . . . [not] absolute beauty . . .; who see the many just and not absolute justice, and the like—such persons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge.”<sup>19</sup> I fully realize the danger which accrues from citing isolated passages of Plato’s dialogues, particularly those which concern the doctrine of ideas. The difficult questions which this doctrine raises lie indeed beyond the scope of an untechnical essay; the citations are justified, however, as merely illustrating one view of Platonic unity, a unity which is

<sup>15</sup> *Phaedo*, 80.<sup>16</sup> *Meno*, 77.<sup>17</sup> *Republic*, 479 (*italics mine*).<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* 490.<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* 479.



uncompounded and undifferentiated and thus opposed to multiplicity.

Contrasted with this is the other Platonic view of unity—*unity compounded of the many*. It is a unity which depends for its very existence and meaning upon multiplicity. The many bound together into a whole—organized, ordered, and harmonized—present a different sort of unity. It is a union of parts, not only admitting but demanding variety, difference, change, and complexity. The organization of life into such a well-ordered communion of parts is Plato's chief ethical task. As "the artist disposes all things in order, and compels the one part to harmonize and accord with the other part, until he has constructed a regular and systematic whole,"<sup>20</sup> so the just man will "look at the city which is within him, and take heed that no disorder occur in it."<sup>21</sup> Strangely at variance with Plato's account of the metaphysical soul as "uncompounded" and "uniform" is his view of the soul's multiplicity and variety essential for the moral life. The image of the soul as a triple animal whose different natures are to grow into one is indeed allegorical<sup>22</sup>; equally allegorical is the description of the soul under the figure of two winged horses and a charioteer<sup>23</sup>; but the reference to "the city which is within" man is not metaphorical. For the entire *Republic* is an exposition of the exact parallelism between the individual and the State. A miniature State is Plato's individual; a magnified individual his State. "In each of us," says Socrates, "there are the same principles and habits which there are in the State"<sup>24</sup>; "the just man . . . will be like the just State."<sup>25</sup> As the State is composed of three classes—justice consisting in their harmonious co-operation—so the individual soul possesses, corresponding to these classes, three principles—desire, passion, and reason, the

<sup>20</sup> Gorgias, 504.

<sup>21</sup> Republic, 492.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. 588 ff.

<sup>23</sup> Phaedrus, 246 ff.

<sup>24</sup> Republic, 435.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

harmonious condition of which defines the just man.<sup>26</sup> In Socrates' own words: "For the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of others; he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together the three principles within him . . . [he] is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature."<sup>27</sup> The just soul is thus a united soul—an organic whole of differentiated, non-interchangeable, and interdependent parts. The same *organic unity*—on a larger scale—characterizes the just State. "Each individual," insists Socrates, "should be put to the use for which nature intended him, one to one work, and then every man would do his own business, *and be one and not many; and so the whole city would be one and not many.*"<sup>28</sup> In Plato's concept of the *well-ordered State* made up of various and distinct classes but "bound each to each in mutual piety," we have the harmonization of unity and plurality. The singleness of the State does not destroy, but on the contrary preserves, its multiplicity. The two concepts are here correlative. The many by retaining as individuals their distinct characters can become one and whole. "Citizens," exclaims Socrates in the parable of the metals, ". . . you are brothers, yet God has framed you differently."<sup>29</sup> That the individuals can achieve genuine individuality only by thus being distinct members of a whole is, of course, a much later thought, though implied in Plato's concept of the State. Whether Plato viewed the universe as having the character of a "well-ordered State" cannot here be asserted with confidence. The *Parmenides* may be quoted in support of this view. And not inimical to such an interpretation is the following

<sup>26</sup> Republic, 441 ff.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. 443.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. 423 (*italics mine*).

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. 415.



passage from the *Gorgias*: "Philosophers tell us," Socrates mentions to Callicles, "that communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and the universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule."<sup>30</sup>

Enough passages have now been quoted, I think, to suggest the nature of Plato's two concepts of unity—one in *essential opposition* to the many, and the other resulting from their *harmonious co-ordination*. I venture to apply the predicate "romantic" to Plato's search after a unity which transcends multiplicity, whereas his view of unity as exemplified in the conception of the "well-ordered State" I regard as "classic." My reason for employing these predicates in connection with Plato is twofold. In the first place, I wish to render the terms "classic" and "romantic"—as far as possible within the limits of this address—philosophically articulate, and thus contribute something toward their rescue from the vagueness and triviality which they have acquired as exclusively literary categories. And in the next place, I find that the romanticists in literature—particularly the German romanticists—share many paradoxical features with Plato, these features in the case of both resulting from an essential clash between the one and the many, between the universal and the particular.<sup>31</sup>

It is the search for a transcendent unity and harmony which leads the "romantic" Plato to invest the multi-

<sup>30</sup> *Gorgias*, 508.

<sup>31</sup> I refer here mainly to German romanticists because it was they—particularly Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829)—who clearly formulated a theory of romanticism which they sought to carry out both in life and in art. The group comprising the "Romantic School" consisted of Friedrich von Hardenberg (called Novalis), the two Schlegels—August and his brother Friedrich—and Ludwig Tieck; but I have in mind their later followers as well, such as Brentano, Arnim, von Kleist, Fouqué, Hoffmann, Chamisso, Eichendorff, Heine. I do not think, however, that there is an essential difference between the romanticism in Germany and what is vaguely enough called by the same name in the literatures of other countries. For the romantic tendencies alluded to in this essay it will not be difficult, therefore, to find illustrations in general European literature.

plicity of the world with a negative character. Speaking broadly, the manifold existences of life when contrasted with the unity of Plato's ideal realm become for him either *grotesque* or *symbolic*. By grotesque I mean to denote his notion of the world of particulars as distorted, meaningless, unreal; by symbolic his other notion that the same world of particulars may yet be viewed by the philosopher as a suggestion or hint or intimation of a transcendent realm of universals. In the words of Pindar: "Things of a day, what are we and what are we not? The dream of a shadow is humankind; yet when a god-given splendor falls, light shines radiant upon men and life is sweet."<sup>32</sup> Grotesque is the world as portrayed in the parable of the den in the seventh Book of the *Republic*. Living in an underground cave, with their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move toward the light which is above and behind them and are therefore doomed to mistake for realities the shadowy images on the screen in front of them—such is the existence of those in the "region of the many and variable." This grotesque world of images or "the shadows of images"<sup>33</sup> is contrasted by Plato with the "upper world" which is revealed to the "mind's eye" of the philosopher. Equally grotesque is the situation of the soul "fastened and glued to the body," as depicted in the *Phaedo*.<sup>34</sup> Philosophy, Socrates tells us, consists in "the study of death"—death to all that which is "of the human and mortal and unintellectual and multiform and dissoluble and changeable."<sup>35</sup> The disciple of philosophy, however, can, according to Plato, overcome the visible and discordant world in yet another way. It is by viewing it as a *sign* or *symbol* of a different

<sup>32</sup> Quoted by J. W. Mackail: *Lectures on Greek Poetry*, London, 1910, p. 120.

<sup>33</sup> *Republic*, 517.

<sup>34</sup> *Phaedo*, 79 ff.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* 80. This notion of "death" occurs in Novalis. Indeed he made a "resolution" thus to die. And in a letter to Friedrich Schlegel (January 20, 1799) he speaks of the longing of Christianity as "absolute Abstraktion, Annihilation des Jetztigen, Apotheose der Zukunft—dieser eigentlichen bessern Welt."



realm. Appearances, apparitions, shadows, ghosts—the “many”—are when taken by themselves weird, grotesque, bizarre; interpreted, however, as suggestions of a reality other and deeper than themselves they become instinct with spiritual significance. It is the particular *as* particular which is unspiritual, sordid, corrupt; as sign or medium of a universal nature it is raised to a different level. Thus Plato’s doctrine of love may be interpreted. The ideal of love, revealed by Diotima in the *Symposium*, is to attain true beauty, “the divine beauty, . . . pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colours and vanities of human life.”<sup>36</sup> But this is the *ideal* goal. As aids to its attainment the earthly beauties themselves, though “clogged with the pollutions of mortality,” become spiritualized. I quote Diotima’s words: “The true order of going . . . to the things of love is to begin from the beauties of the earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is.”<sup>37</sup> The discussion in the *Phaedrus* whether the non-lover or the lover is to be preferred revolves around the same distinction between false love and true love. Grotesque is the notion of love which is not “the love of immortality,”<sup>38</sup> “taken from some haunt of sailors,”<sup>39</sup> whereas true love is symbolic, i.e., beauty of bodily form is to be loved as an intimation and expression of divine beauty.<sup>40</sup> “Sight is the most piercing of our bodily

<sup>36</sup> *Symposium*, 211.<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.* 211.<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.* 207.<sup>39</sup> *Phaedrus*, 243.

<sup>40</sup> This doctrine of “symbolic love” is one of the cardinal teachings of German romanticism. It has received a variety of expression. The attitude of the lover toward the beloved in Friedrich Schlegel’s *Lucinde* is typical. Says *Lucinde*’s lover: “Lass mich’s bekennen, ich liebe nicht dich allein, ich liebe die Weiblichkeit selbst. Ich liebe sie nicht bloss, ich bete sie an, weil ich die Menschheit anbete.” (Edition 1799, p. 70.)

senses," says Socrates, "though not by that is wisdom seen; her loveliness would have been transporting if there had been a visible image of her, and the other ideas, if they had visible counterparts, would be equally lovely. But this is the privilege of beauty, that being the loveliest she is also the most palpable to sight. . . . He . . . who has been the spectator of many glories in the other world, is amazed when he sees any one having a godlike face or any bodily form which is the expression of divine beauty . . .; looking upon the face of his beloved as of a god he reverences him, and if he were not afraid of being thought a downright madman, he would sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a god."<sup>41</sup> In the seventh Book of the *Republic* a similar contrast is brought out between the objects of sense and the objects of science. The study of astronomy, for instance, when its objects are the mere visible and perishable stars, is rebuked by Socrates. Thus: "That knowledge only which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards, and whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science; his soul is looking downwards, not upwards, whether his way to knowledge is by water or by land, whether he floats or only lies on his back."<sup>42</sup> Arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and the kindred sciences of relations and order have for Plato educational value because they are suggestive or symbolic of the ideal world. They tend "to make more easy the vision of the idea of good."<sup>43</sup>

Many more passages could be cited to show that the "region of the many and variable" is viewed by Plato now as grotesque or unreal or impure, now as symbolic or suggestive or representative of the absolute and permanent "upper world." What I wish to emphasize, how-

<sup>41</sup> Phaedrus, 250-251.

<sup>42</sup> Republic, 529.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. 526.



ever, is this—the clash between unity and multiplicity, between the ideal and the real, with the consequent transformation of the latter into the grotesque or the symbolic is the very *differentia* of romanticism. The pendular oscillation between the grotesque and the symbolic—between regarding the particulars of the world now as illusory, now as intimations of the infinite—appears to be at the root of most of the romantic paradoxes. It is this oscillation which renders intelligible the union of so many contradictory traits found in both the life and the art of romanticists. Cynicism and reverence; self-parody and self-worship; self-concentration and self-expansion; individualism and cosmopolitanism; loyalty and infidelity; dreamful ease and prodigious activity; superficiality and profundity—these are but a few romantic tendencies having their source in the Platonic longing for an ideal world opposed to the actual.<sup>44</sup>

The romanticists are adept specialists in the art of the grotesque. I need but allude to the tales of Novalis, Tieck, Chamisso, Hoffmann, Victor Hugo, Poe. With the German romanticists, however, the cultivation of the grotesque is a conscious design to destroy the common conceptions of things. It is a quasi-Socratic *reductio ad absurdum* of the generally accepted world. For the romanticists the world is full of wonder and mystery undreamt of by the “many,” the philistines. But this wonder and mystery, because so obvious to them, lose their strangeness. Hence the reverse romantic tendency to depict the miraculous and the fabulous as the familiar. The romantic world is veritably *verkehrt*. The familiar becomes strange, the strange familiar; the near grows far, the far near. It is to this spirit that we owe a wealth

<sup>44</sup> I should not be understood as deriving romanticism historically from Plato. I am well aware, in the case of German romanticism, of the intimate relation between it and the Fichtean philosophy. I am using romanticism here as an elemental attitude possessing philosophic generality, of which the Fichtean doctrine of the world-building and world-destroying Infinite Self, engaged in the restless quest after an unattainable ideal, is itself a notable expression.

of modern fairy tales and an appreciative interest in distant languages and literatures.

His longing for an ideal harmonious world determines the romanticist's strange theory of values. The worth of things resides in the moods they arouse, the dreams they inspire, the hidden realities they suggest.

"To me the meanest flower that blows can give  
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears,"

says Wordsworth at the close of his *Ode on Immortality*. Or in the words of another poet,

"Not the slightest leaf but trembling teems  
With golden visions and romantic dreams."

Contrasted with the ideal, all particular things and interests are equally nugatory; as suggestions or symbols of the ideal everything is equally relevant. This double standard applied to *all* things, at once or successively, is typically romantic. It engenders an elasticity of mood and feeling and thought and expression which is consistent in its capriciousness. Loyalty to the ideal requires a constant flux of symbols. In order not to become enmeshed in particulars the romanticist must continually transcend them. So it comes about that for him loyalty and infidelity are Siamese twins. Loyalty to the universal is conditioned upon faithlessness to the particulars. The symbolic character of the particular can be demonstrated only by forsaking and exchanging it for another particular. The romanticist may therefore be called an intellectual and emotional "polygamist." In love with the infinite, no finite aim, interest, mood, or person can lay claim to his sustained fidelity. Because his allegiance belongs to the eternal he must perforce repudiate temporary and transient embodiments of it.

"No more of me ye knew,  
My Love!  
No more of me ye knew,"



is the "rover's adieu" to his fugitive attachments. Paradoxical though it may seem, fickleness is the very expression of his constancy. Don Juan is the romanticist's most faithful lover.

Thus in search for unity and harmony the romanticist becomes a wanderer from particular to particular. *Wanderlust*—the universal romantic *motif*—acquires for him the dignity of a philosophic principle. Aimlessness, exemplified, for instance, in Eichendorff's *Das Leben eines Taugenichts*, is his conscious aim, and is extended as a programme to all intellectual, emotional, and imaginative pursuits. The acquisition of a definite and particular purpose is accompanied with the ache of self-limitation, and calls therefore for relief through the cultivation of new interests. For particular ends and purposes are but transient means to appease one's yearning after the infinite. Care must be taken to discover constantly new means. The frequent abandonment of particular interests is the romanticist's sincere proof that his goal is the universal, not the particular. Hence his protean activity, his catholicity, his versatility. His is the life of the adventurous wanderer. He roams through field and forest, art and religion, philosophy and science, life and love, with the *élan vital* of Shelley's *West Wind*. He heeds not the call,

"Wild Spirit which art moving everywhere;  
Destroyer and preserver; hear, O hear!"

Of necessity then his nature must be untamed and undisciplined. Discipline and waywardness do not dwell within the same breast. In this the romanticist glories. The wanderer's life alone is the free life. The freedom romanticism eulogizes is the *freedom from particularity*. Stoicism too advocates such freedom. But there is a radical difference between the two. Stoicism wins its independence by withdrawing from the particulars; roman-

ticism by pursuing and appropriating *all* possible particulars. The stoic turns his back upon the vicissitudes and complexities of life; the romanticist experiments and plays with them. The freedom from particulars, from their ties and responsibilities which the player and the wanderer alone enjoy, is the romantic ideal. Viewing thus all things through the eyes of the passing pilgrim, the romanticist can give you no definite picture of what he sees. He can but give you his fugitive and sensitive impressions. For this reason all romantic art has a lyrical quality about it. It is an art of suggestion and mood. It is what the Germans call *stimmungsvoll*. And no accident is it that romantic art excels in the epigram, the fragment, the lyric, the essay, the tale, the song, and all the other casual forms of expression. Romantic achievement is the achievement which requires no sustained effort, no prolonged attention, being the product of the moment's mood and inspiration. Thoroughly at home the German romanticists—so protean in their interests and so prodigious in their industry—were in no one field. They paid the price of the rover's life. The pathos of the wanderer's homelessness none felt more keenly than they. In endless pursuit of their ideal, seeking and finding no particular object which will embody it, doomed therefore to aimless and restless straying, the romanticists have repeatedly given voice to the thought,

“We look before and after,  
And pine for what is not.”

The romantic fate has perhaps been most pointedly stated by the author of the *Imitation of Christ*. Thus: “Thou hast no dwelling city and wherever thou be thou art as a stranger and a pilgrim.” You will also recall the lamentation of Schubert's *Wanderer*: “*Dort wo Du nicht bist, da ist das Glück.*”



Consistent with his theory of values is the romanticist's attitude toward himself. As "destroyer" and "preserver" he ranges and strays among the experiences of his inner life which can afford him a resting place as little as the world outside him. Here again he is a stranger and a pilgrim. At once "grotesque" and "symbolic," distorted and clear, worthless and profound, ephemeral and infinite his passions and thoughts and moods appear to him.<sup>45</sup> As particular among particulars he is himself something to be estranged from and forsaken. But like all things finite, he also

"Hath had elsewhere its setting,  
And cometh from afar."

He is not only finite; he too is an intimation of the infinite. Thus the dramatic oscillation between the grotesque and the symbolic is projected into the romanticist's inner life. In his exalted moods he regards himself as God's beloved, as the inspired vehicle of the Eternal. Hence his genuine love and reverence for himself. His dreams, his words, his tears, are instinct with universal meaning; he bares them as revelations of a nature deeper and vaster than his own; they have for him the awesome significance of oracular signs. Thus sings Emerson:

"I am owner of the sphere,  
Of the seven stars and the solar year,  
Of Caesar's hand and Plato's brain,  
Of Lord Christ's heart, and Shakespeare's strain."

<sup>45</sup> This is a familiar paradox in romantic literature. Goethe's *Faust* complains:

"Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust;  
Die eine will sich von der andern trennen;  
Die eine hält in derber Liebeslust,  
Sich an die Welt, mit klammernden Organen;  
Die andre hebt gewaltsam sich vom Dust  
Zu den Gefühlen hoher Ahnen."

And Victor Hugo's *Mahomet* laments:

"Je suis le lieu vil des sublimes combats:  
Tantôt l'homme d'en haut, et tantôt l'homme d'en bas;  
Et le mal dans ma bouche avec le bien alterne,  
Comme dans le désert le sable et la citerne."

But—and here is the romantic paradox—because he is a symbol of the divine, because he worships the ideal within him, he must burst the bonds of his own particularity, he must not be smothered in the flux of his inner life. The deep love of the universal of which he is a medium leads him to absolve himself from himself, not indeed in the stoic's or in the mystic's fashion. The romantic way is the cynical way. Self-parody is the romanticist's mode of purging himself of his particularity. Cynical self-contemplation is the "destroyer" of his ephemeral and the "preserver" of his eternal nature. Cynicism toward himself becomes his sublimest expression of reverence for the universal, just as his deliberate infidelity to definite ends was the very instrumentality by which the romanticist could show his supreme allegiance and longing for the infinite. Self-parody is thus seen to be a method of solving the Platonic problem of the universal and the particular.

Viewed thus, the principle of "romantic irony," formulated by Friedrich Schlegel with especial reference to the artist's attitude toward his work, is simply another aspect of romantic freedom from particularity. It is, to borrow a phrase from Walter Pater, the "fastidious refusal to be or do any limited thing." The romanticist refuses to identify himself with his work because, being particular, it never can be an adequate expression of his infinite ambition. For the romantic ideal is the universal—Schlegel's *Universalpoesie*; as such it can achieve no realization in any *particular* content and form. The artist's love for art is to be measured by his ability to transcend his own product. Freedom and independence of his own particular efforts are demonstrated by his willingness ever to repudiate them. The test of his earnestness is self-irony. Irony is his explicit acknowledgment that the ideal is more precious than the actual. Irony toward his work is simply the disavowal of the particular-



ity which attaches to it in favor of the universal essence of which it is to be an intimation. With the various ways in which this principle of irony has been applied, notably by Tieck and Byron and Heine, and more recently by Shaw, we are here not concerned.

These are but a few romantic trends and paradoxes which have their *logical* source in the Platonic longing for an ideal and harmony transcending this world of the "many and variable." In his *Lucinde*—a book which contains in a nutshell the entire philosophy of romanticism, theoretical and applied—Friedrich Schlegel characterizes the object of romantic longing as longing itself. And Novalis has supplied the symbol for this notion in his well-known figure of the "blue flower." The concept "longing for longing" is typically Platonic. Longing as such, by being its own object and devoid of definite content, becomes a sort of "colourless, formless, intangible essence,"<sup>46</sup> which can find embodiment or rest in no particular nature. More than a superficial resemblance has this idea of longing to Schopenhauer's notion of the "will," but what interests us here is the Platonic dualism of the universal and the particular implied in it. Infinite longing and the many and the particular objects of longing cannot coalesce; for ever sundered they must remain, since the only *definite* thing which longing seeks is *indefinite* longing itself. It is this yearning after itself—a transcendent thing—which sends the romanticist a-roving. It is this which constitutes the romantic career—

"To burst all links of habit—there to wander far away,  
On from island unto island at the gateways of the day."

It is this which explains his eternal *Wanderlust* among all experience, among all the objects of nature and life, of love and art.

While the romanticist's longing can never come to rest, it seems to find a momentary haven of refuge in the

<sup>46</sup> Phaedrus, 247.

contemplation of the past. The modern historic spirit, inaugurated by the German romanticists, is intimately bound up with romantic longing. Their interest in the past springs from the feeling that the harmony and unity longed for had once been realized, had had embodiment in epochs remote from the present. The historic spirit of romanticism consists in a conscious reconstruction of the past in terms of an ideal vainly sought for here and now.<sup>47</sup> Thus the past becomes idealized. And thus commences the romantic *regressive* pilgrimage. The Middle Ages, Hellas, or perchance a more antique Golden Age, are endowed with the heaven of beauty and harmony and perfection. The isles of Greece become romantic Arcadia; and the unmatched glories and splendors of mediæval life, art, and religion were not seen until discovered, loved, and cherished by romantic poets. This idealization of the remote past, and the motives for it, the romanticists share with Plato. In Plato also may be found the projection into antiquity—a very *remote* antiquity in his case—of an ideal and perfection “not varying from generation and corruption.” The Platonic theory of “recollection” is based upon the assumption of a previous existence more perfect than the present. All knowing, all learning is but recalling what the soul beheld in that perfect state. “The Soul,” Socrates states in the *Meno*, “. . . being immortal, and having seen all things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew . . .; the soul has learned all things, there is no difficulty in her eliciting, or as men say learning, out of a single recollection all the rest . . .; for all enquiry and all learning is

<sup>47</sup> The historic spirit of romanticism should not be confused with that of Hegel. In general, the romanticists emphasize the discontinuity of past and present, exemplified in *Die Christenheit oder Europa* by Novalis, in *Atala* by Chateaubriand, in Rousseau's works; whereas Hegel insists upon their continuity. The romanticists look backward for an ideal in contrast with the actual; Hegel looks to the past for the seeds of the full-grown present.



but recollection.”<sup>48</sup> The *Phaedrus* likewise goes back to a former state of existence, in which the gods and men have once seen the divine forms of “justice, and temperance, and knowledge absolute, not in the form of generation or of relation, which men call existence, but knowledge absolute in existence absolute.”<sup>49</sup> Plato’s “golden age” is depicted more vividly and more poetically in the following passage: “There was a time when . . . we beheld the beatific vision and were initiated into a mystery which may be truly called most blessed, celebrated by us in our state of innocence, before we had any experience of evils to come, when we were admitted to the sight of apparitions innocent and simple and calm and happy, which we beheld shining in pure light, pure ourselves and not yet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the body, like an oyster in his shell.”<sup>50</sup> This “historic” spirit of Plato, this looking “backward” to a blessed “state of innocence” is born of the same yearning as that of the romanticists, the yearning to find in a “previous” existence unity, harmony, perfection, and an escape from the present strife of the one and the many, the universal and the particular.

The “classic” trend of Plato remains now to be briefly suggested. Whereas his romanticism lies in the clash between unity and multiplicity and in the consequent transformation of the latter into the grotesque or the symbolic, the ideal which dominates his classicism consists in the reconciliation of the one and the many, the universal and the particular. In his “well-ordered State” Plato has defined for us a novel concept of unity—a unity which logically requires multiplicity. It is the unity of a *whole* which results from the organization and co-ordination of the many. Here diverse elements are welded together into an harmonious structure. Here we have a

<sup>48</sup> *Meno*, 81.<sup>49</sup> *Phaedrus*, 247.<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 250.

unity which is compounded of the many. Here the particulars constitute a universal. These particulars—the many elements of the State—are not ephemeral shadows or faint copies of a transcendent universal; they are real and necessary and constitutive parts of a whole. Thus, universal and particular, whole and part, unity and multiplicity are interdependent and mutually inclusive. The problem of monism and pluralism—to use metaphysical concepts—receives here perhaps its only adequate solution. Unity without multiplicity is “empty”; multiplicity without unity “blind.” Plato’s State illustrates a multiplicity which is an organic unity, a unity which is a well-ordered multiplicity.

The parts which constitute such an organic union, however, cannot be equal. The State is a whole which is no mere sum of external parts; its wholeness is achieved through differentiation. That is, the particulars which enter into such union must be *different* particulars; otherwise we should have a blurred and not a well-ordered whole. One particular member of the State, for instance, cannot be allowed to usurp the function of another particular. Each has in the structure of the whole a unique and distinct place. “In all well-ordered States,” says Socrates in the *Republic*, “every individual has an occupation to which he must attend.”<sup>51</sup> Also, “Each individual should be put to the use for which nature intended him.”<sup>52</sup> Justice of the State as well as of the individual resides for Plato in the harmonious co-operation of *distinct* interests and activities. The just soul is the well-ordered soul; the just State is the well-ordered State. Well-ordered organizations then are unities which are composed of a plurality of distinct parts. The wholeness of any organism is secured, preserved, and rendered effective by the very particularization and specialization of its members. Thus not escape from particularity, as

<sup>51</sup> Republic, 406.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. 423.



demanding by romanticism, but loyalty to the special rôle which the whole assigns to each of its members is the classic ideal. Not freedom from particularity—the romantic ambition—but freedom to be a particular, to have a definite place in the organic composition of the whole is the classic aim.

To exhibit in detail that the Platonic notion of “organic unity” or “organic wholeness” is at the basis of the classic theory of art lies beyond the province of this paper. I hope I shall be pardoned, however, for citing in this connection a lengthy but significant passage from S. H. Butcher.

“It may be noticed,” says he, commenting on Aristotle’s *Poetics*, “that the opposition between ~~the~~ the poet and the historian in the *Poetics* is incidentally introduced to illustrate the sense in which a tragedy is one and a whole. These two notions as understood by Aristotle are not identical. A unity is composed of a plurality of parts which cohere together and fall under a common idea but are not necessarily combined in a definite order. The notion of a whole implies something more. The parts which constitute it must be inwardly connected, arranged in a certain order, structurally related, and combined into a system. A whole is not a mere mass or sum of external parts which may be transposed at will, any one of which may be omitted without perceptibly affecting the rest. It is a unity which is unfolded and expanded according to the law of its own nature, an organism which develops from within. By the rule, again, of beauty, which is a first requirement of art, a poetic creation must exhibit at once unity and plurality. . . . The idea of an organism evidently underlies all Aristotle’s rules about unity; it is tacitly assumed as a first principle of art, and in one passage is expressly mentioned as that from which the rule of epic unity is deduced. ‘The plot must, as in a tragedy, be dramatically constructed; it must have for its subject a single action, whole and complete, with a beginning, a middle, and an end. *It will thus resemble a single and coherent organism*, and produce the pleasure proper to it.’

“Plato in the *Phaedrus* had insisted that every artistic composition, whether in prose or verse, should have an organic unity. ‘You will allow that every discourse ought to be constructed like a living organism, having its own body and head and feet; it must have middle and extremities, drawn in a manner agreeable to one another and to the

whole.' Aristotle took up the hint; the passage above quoted from the *Poetics* is a remarkable echo of the words of the *Phaedrus*; and indeed the idea may be said to be at the basis of his whole poetic criticism."<sup>53</sup>

There is no need to show in this essay how the Platonic ideal of a well-ordered whole dominates the practice of Greek art as well as its theory. This ideal it is which furnishes a standard of character and life associated with "the glory that was Greece." A criterion of conduct as well as of taste is supplied by it. The harmony and coherence and repose of classic art, the felicity and beauty and restraint of classic life, are grounded in the Platonic conception of "organic unity." And this conception, in both its aesthetic and moral excellence, is the model of modern classicism. French literature in the seventeenth century is classic in this sense. And the same classic ideal inspires the mature poetry of Goethe and of Schiller. It is the Platonic view of a well-ordered and harmonious whole which defines, for instance, in *Wilhelm Meister* and in *Iphigenie* Goethe's standard of conduct and of art.

I am convinced that an analysis more exhaustive than here attempted of Plato's two concepts of unity would yield a logical basis for defining most of the problems connected with classicism and romanticism both in art and in philosophy. Here I could do no more than suggest that the distinction between the classic and the romantic ideals is fundamental and intimately related to the Platonic teachings. Whether Plato was essentially a classicist or essentially a romanticist, or both in strange union, I do not know. I must reiterate, as I close, that I venture upon no interpretation of Plato himself. However the classic and the romantic trends in his writings be explained, the distinction between them is important. For here, to speak with Socrates, "no light matter is at stake, nothing less than the rule of human life."

<sup>53</sup> Aristotle's *Theory of Poetry and Fine Arts*, Fourth Edition, Macmillan Co. London, 1911, pp. 186-189.



## A POSSIBLE CASE OF LUKAN AUTHORSHIP

(JOHN 7 53-8 11)

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In his *Philology of the Gospels*<sup>1</sup> Professor Blass referred somewhat casually to the Lukan style of the *pericope adulterae*. His theory of a Roman edition of Luke's works issued by the author himself, in connection with which his reference was made, has not received very wide acceptance, and so the linguistic phenomena to which he called attention were not made generally known. The motives of the present writer in bringing the subject forward again are not merely that the Lukan style of this passage impressed itself independently upon him, as it might upon any one familiar with Luke's style, but because von Soden's careful study of the text of the passage,<sup>2</sup> and Harnack's recent use of the style of the Lukan writings<sup>3</sup> make it desirable to give a fresh presentation of the evidence.

With regard to the text of the *pericope adulterae* it must at once be confessed that it is one of the most uncertain passages in the whole N. T. The variants are extremely numerous, and as the section is entirely omitted by most of the great uncial MSS., a decision on readings cannot be made by the usual methods of valuation. Von Soden divided the authorities into seven main groups, and attempted to appraise them and arrange them and so to recover the original text. To many however his reconstruction will not seem convincing. It will be safer therefore for us in considering the style of the passage

<sup>1</sup> P. 159 (1898) with a reference to his edition of Luke, (1897) p. xlviii.

<sup>2</sup> Die Schriften des N. T. I, pp. 486-524.

<sup>3</sup> Especially Luke the Physician and The Date of the Acts.

to limit ourselves to no one form of the text but to include all variants, remembering constantly that some of the examples given are probably not the original readings.<sup>4</sup>

The style of Luke, on the other hand, has become better known with the study of his writings. He has the most distinctive vocabulary of any New Testament writer, and a style so individual as to be recognizable in nearly every verse. No matter what his subject or his source, these characteristics make themselves everywhere evident. Not merely in the nativity stories with their canticles at the beginning of his work, nor in the "we" passages at its close, may we find with Harnack abundant evidences of his style. Even the stories which he takes bodily from Mark are filled with his own peculiar ways of speech<sup>5</sup>; so homogeneous is the style of the Lukan writings. It is therefore all the more striking that this brief passage—bearing as it does the evidence of antiquity and verisimilitude, yet certainly not part of the Fourth Gospel, as both its language and the MSS. prove—should reveal nevertheless so many marks, some of them almost unmistakable, of Luke's style.

First let us consider the negative evidence. There are of course some words in the passage that do not occur in Luke or Acts. They are

ἀναμάρτητος

αὐτοφώρῳ αὐτοφόρῳ αὐτῷ τῷ φόρῳ

διακελεύω (μ<sup>1</sup>)

καταγράφω (μ<sup>1 2</sup>)

κατακίπτω κάτω κύπτω

κατηγορία <sup>4</sup>(D) <sup>6</sup>(μ<sup>2 3 4 6 7</sup>) (a variant in Lk. 6 7)

μοιχεία (all MSS. except D)

The first five of these are not found in any New Testament writer but are all compound words in the

<sup>4</sup> All readings that are not found in all groups of MSS. will be marked below with von Soden's symbols for the groups that contain them, e.g., μ<sup>1</sup>, μ<sup>2</sup>, etc. The numbers represent very nearly the order of preference given the groups by von Soden.

<sup>5</sup> See Plummer, Luke, *passim*.



manner of Luke. Compare his use of ἀπο-γράφω, ἀνα-κύπτω συν-κύπτω, δια-τάσσω, etc.<sup>6</sup>

There are also some expressions which are less like Luke than like some other New Testament writer. The mention of the Jews in D and one or two other MSS., the use of "high priests and Pharisees" (μ<sup>1</sup>) in place of "scribes and Pharisees," are both variants that agree exactly with the manner of the Fourth Gospel. And the reading (μ<sup>4</sup> 5) μηκέτι ἀμάρτανε without ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν agrees exactly with Jn. 5 14. For the reading εἰς καθ' εἰς (μ<sup>2</sup> 3 4 5 6 7) perhaps the nearest parallel is in Mk. 14 19 (εἰς κατὰ εἰς).

Compare now with these possible linguistic affiliations to the other Gospels the likenesses of the passage to Luke-Acts.

The following words or phrases occurring in this passage occur in Luke or Acts but in no other Gospel:

ἀνακύπτω  
 ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν (μ<sup>1</sup> 2 3 6 7)  
 εἰς ἐκαστός <sup>8</sup> (μ<sup>5</sup> 6) <sup>9</sup> (μ<sup>1</sup>)  
 ἐπιμένω  
 ἐκπειράζω (μ<sup>2</sup> D)<sup>7</sup>  
 κατήγορος (μ<sup>3</sup> 5 6 7)  
 ὀρθρος cf. ὀρθρίζω, ὀρθρινός  
 προσποιέομαι (μ<sup>5</sup> 7)  
 σὺ οὖν <sup>8</sup>  
 συνείδησις (μ<sup>5</sup> 7)

More striking still is the list of words found in the *pericope*, which though not limited to Luke are more abundant in his work than in the other Gospels. From Hawkins' lists of Lukan phrases <sup>9</sup> we find in this passage:

ἄγω (μ<sup>1</sup> 2 3 5 6 7)  
 εἶπεν δέ, εἶπαν δέ

<sup>6</sup> Plummer, Luke, p. 252: "Lk. is fond of compounds with διὰ." There are over 50 words compounded with κατὰ which occur in Luke or Acts but not in Mt., Mk., or Jn.

<sup>7</sup> The word occurs also in Mt. 4 7 (=Lk. 4 12) in a quotation from Dt. 6 16.

<sup>8</sup> According to Bruder only Lk. 4 7, 22 70; Ac. 23 21.

<sup>9</sup> Horae Synopticae, Second Edition, pp. 15-29.

ἔρωτάω ( $\mu^1 2 3 4 5 7$ )

ἔχω, with infinitive ( $\mu^5$ )

λαός

νῦν

πᾶς, or ἅπας ὁ λαός ( $\mu^1 3 5 6 7$ )

παραγίνομαι

πλήν ( $\mu^5 7$ )

ὡς=when

According to Harnack<sup>10</sup> we are justified in marking as Lukan:

εἰς τὸν οἶκον ( $\mu^2 3 5 6 7$ )

ἐν μέσῳ

πορεύομαι

αὕτη ἡ γυνή ( $\mu^1 2 3 4 5$ )

ὡς δέ

Further examples may be gained from the lexicon:

οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες ( $\mu^2 3 4 5 6 7$ ) (once in Mk.)

ἔρχομαι ἀπό (once in Mt.)

παραγίνομαι εἰς ( $\mu^1 2 3 5 7$ ) (once in Mt.)

πορεύου (twice in Jn.)

In the following cases there is a likeness of expression such as commonly exists between the different parts of Luke's writings:

Ἰησοῦς δὲ ἐπορεύθη εἰς τὸ ὄρος τῶν ἐλαιῶν

Lk. 22 39 καὶ ἐξελθὼν ἐπορεύθη κατὰ τὸ ἔθος εἰς τὸ ὄρος τῶν ἐλαιῶν

ὁρθοῦ δὲ πάλιν παρεγένετο εἰς τὸ ἱερόν καὶ πᾶς ὁ λαὸς ἤρχετο  
πρὸς αὐτόν

Lk. 21 38 καὶ πᾶς ὁ λαὸς ὠρθριζεν πρὸς αὐτόν ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ

καὶ στήσαντες αὐτήν ἐν μέσῳ λέγουσιν αὐτῷ

Ac. 4 7 καὶ στήσαντες αὐτοὺς ἐν μέσῳ ἐπυνθάνοντο

ταύτην εὗρομεν ἐπ' αὐτωφώρῳ μοιχευομένην ( $\mu^6 7$ )

Lk. 23 2 τοῦτον εὗραμεν διαστρέφοντα τὸ ἔθνος ἡμῶν κτλ; cf. Ac. 24 5.

ἵνα σχῶσιν (ἔχωσιν, εὗρωσιν) κατηγορεῖν (κατηγορίαν κατ')  
αὐτοῦ

<sup>10</sup> See Date of the Acts, pp. 5, 6, 9, 15; Luke the Physician, pp. 40, 50 f.

Lk. 6 7 ἵνα εὕρωσιν κατηγορεῖν (κατηγορίαν κατ') αὐτοῦ

Lk. 11 54 D al ἵνα εὕρωσιν κατηγορῆσαι

Ac. 28 19 ἔχων τι κατηγορεῖν

ὁρθρου δὲ βαθέως πάλιν ἦλθεν (μ<sup>6</sup>)

Lk. 24 1 ὁρθρου βαθέως ἐπὶ τὸ μνημα ἦλθαν

καὶ καθίσας ἐδίδασκεν αὐτοὺς (μ<sup>1 2 3 5 6 7</sup>)

Lk. 5 3 καθίσας δὲ [ . . . ] ἐδίδασκεν τοὺς ὄχλους

Further examples of likeness are in construction and sentence structure:

With πρώτος βαλέτω λίθον compare

Lk. 2 2 αὕτη ἀπογραφὴ πρώτη ἐγένετο and other adverbial uses of the adjective in Lk. 21 34, 24 18, 22, Ac. 20 6 D, 28 13.

With the position of the pronoun in σὺ οὖν τί λέγεις; compare

Lk. 16 7 σὺ δὲ πόσον ὀφείλεις;

Ac. 11 17 ἐγὼ τίς ἤμην δύνατος κωλύσαι τὸν θεόν;

Ac. 19 15 ὑμεῖς δὲ τίνες ἐστέ;

With the use of the participle in ἐπέμενον ἐρωτῶντες compare

Ac. 12 16 ἐπέμενον κρούων

Lk. 7 45 οὐ διέλιπεν καταφιλοῦσα

Also Lk. 23 12; Ac. 8 16

With κατελείφθη μόνος compare

Lk. 10 40 μόνην με κατέλειπεν διακονεῖν

With the brief οὐδεὶς in οὐδεὶς, κύριε of the woman's reply compare

Lk. 22 35 . . . μή τινος ὑστηρήσατε; οἱ δὲ εἶπαν, οὐθενός

With κύριε in the same reply compare

Ac. 10 14, 11 8 μηδαμῶς, κύριε

Lk. 17 37 ποῦ, κύριε;

Ac. 9 5, 22 8, 26 15 τίς εἶ, κύριε;

Ac. 10 4 τί ἐστιν, κύριε;

With πορεύου' ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν μηκέτι ἀμάρτανε compare

Lk. 5 10 μὴ φοβοῦ' ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἀνθρώπους ἔσῃ ζωγρῶν



No other N. T. writing has such close parallels as those given from Luke and Acts.

In view of the many misuses of the linguistic argument, especially in connection with Luke-Acts, it would be rash to assume at once from this evidence that the *pericope adulterae* is written by Luke. It is necessary to acknowledge that there are many limitations to the force of the examples given. First, few of them have unanimous textual support; second, many of them are not very unusual phrases in Greek literature. That no other New Testament writer uses a word is often an accident. But if N. T. standards are to be applied, there are a few unquestioned words that are really characteristic of Luke, as ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν, ἀρχομαι ἀπὸ, ἐπιμένω, εἶπεν δέ, ὥς. And while of course some of the variants must be rejected, any form of the text which we accept, even von Soden's, which is the shortest, will include more than half of our list of examples. It can safely be affirmed that the passage in its oldest form contained as much distinctively Lukan language as the average passage of equal brevity and simplicity in Luke's acknowledged works.

Against the theory of Lukan authorship the subject-matter and method of treatment offer no objection, but rather a confirmation. The third evangelist shows throughout a sympathy with women and with sinners that is congenial to this passage. Jesus' association with them is frequently criticised by the strict Pharisees in Luke. No further example is needed than the story of Simon and the sinner woman in Luke 7 36-50.

Textual evidence, however, does not encourage the hypothesis. As is well known, the best Greek MSS. omit the passage entirely (Σ, ABCLW et al.). It was known, however, in the West, as is shown by the Vulgate and perhaps some earlier Latin versions, by the references in Ambrose, Augustine, and Jerome, and by the early

Greco-Latin codex D. Nearly all the authorities that contain or refer to it put it in chapter eight or at the end of the Gospel of John. The only exception is the Ferrar group which places it after Luke 21 38.<sup>11</sup> There is therefore little textual reason to assign it to any of the canonical Gospels, and less for Luke than for John.<sup>12</sup>

These facts bring us to a dilemma, either solution of which seems to contradict the current standards of New Testament criticism: either (1) the *pericope adulterae* is an original part of Luke's Gospel and was omitted without leaving any appreciable trace in the MS. tradition of that Gospel, or (2) it is written by another than the third evangelist in a style that completely matches his own.<sup>13</sup>

This paper aims not to solve the dilemma but to state it and to show its importance. For if the first solution is the correct one, then we must believe that in spite of their age, multiplicity, and agreement, our authorities for the N. T. text do not preclude such radical divergence from the autographs as the complete omission of a considerable section from one of the four Gospels. If this is possible, then certainly many of the most radical theories of interpolation and the most unsupported textual conjectures are also possible. Even radical scholars have often declared for the probable integrity of the best texts. Here, however, we should have a flagrant case of primitive tampering, for the omission could only be intentional.<sup>14</sup> And so our confidence in the transcriptional accuracy and in the doctrinal primitiveness of

<sup>11</sup> Also *Evangelistarium* 435.

<sup>12</sup> Of course its historicity is not dependent on its canonicity. Its internal character, agreeing as it does with the synoptic stories, bespeaks its genuineness as a tradition.

<sup>13</sup> I omit as unlikely a third alternative—that it was part of a third (lost) work of the third evangelist. Blass's view that it was from a second edition of the third gospel issued by the author himself combines the difficulties of this view with those of (1) above.

<sup>14</sup> The motive would probably be the fear that the section would be abused to condone looseness in sexual relations.

the earliest available text of the N. T. would be considerably shaken.

If, on the other hand, the passage is not from the pen of the *auctor ad Theophilum*, then some one, whether another author, a translator, or a scribe, intentionally or unintentionally,<sup>15</sup> wrote a style that is indistinguishable from the most distinctive of New Testament styles. In this case style proves to be a most unreliable criterion, and all critical arguments drawn from identity of style—such as the common authorship of John and 1 John, of Luke and Acts, of the Pauline letters, and even of the separate parts of a single work—lose some of their weight. Especially such an argument as that often made concerning the Lukan style of the “we” passages must be re-examined in the light of this evidence.<sup>16</sup> For if in the *pericope adulterae* identity of style does not even prove final Lukan editing, it certainly cannot be used to prove in the “we” passages original Lukan authorship without sources.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> The decision between these alternatives and concerning the actual origin of the section if not from Luke forms a most interesting problem, but does not affect the implications of the main dilemma. Eus. H. E. III. 39, 16 suggests two possible second-century sources. He says: “(Papias) relates another story of a woman, who was accused of many sins before the Lord, which is contained in the Gospel according to the Hebrews.” The evidence of the story’s western circulation and the variety of its readings may suggest that it was translated into Greek from the Latin. That the later scribes wrote a style like Luke’s is not improbable. Blass, *Evangelium secundum Lucam*, 1897, pp. lvii ff., has given some interesting cases from variants in Mark, and unless one accepts his hypothesis of two editions by Luke, his evidence for the Lukan style of the “Western” text of Luke and Acts (cf. his *Professor Harnack und die Schriften des Lukas*, 1907) will point in the same direction. That this “Lukanizing” is intentional is improbable. Perhaps the style of Luke was the most familiar to the scribes and probably it was the most congenial to them on account of its literary quality. Many of Luke’s minor changes in Mark are made independently by scribes of Mark, e.g., in D.  $\epsilon\gamma\omega$  for  $\phi\epsilon\rho\omega$ .

<sup>16</sup> The argument that the “we” passages are so distinctly Lukan in style that the author cannot be using a source is presented most fully by Harnack, *Luke the Physician* (1906), pp. 40–120; *Date of the Acts* (1911), pp. 1–28; cf. also Hawkins, *Horae Synopticae*, Second Edition, pp. 182 ff. The inference of these scholars is that therefore Luke and Acts were written by a companion of Paul, presumably Luke.

<sup>17</sup> Since the foregoing article was written there has come to hand H. McLachlan’s *St. Luke Evangelist and Historian* (1912), with its full and independent argument for the Lukan authorship of the *pericope adulterae* (pp. 94–126).



## THE EVER MEMORABLE MR. JOHN HALES

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In the midst of dusty records in long-forgotten corners of history one sometimes comes pleasantly upon personalities which have all the freshness and charm of present-day acquaintances. At once they become such real friends that one wonders how they have escaped more general notice. One feels that it must have been untoward circumstances only which veiled their light and kept its radiance from shining down the centuries to reveal them at least to their spiritual kin of later times.

Such a one was John Hales of Eton College, called curiously enough by his own generation and that following the "ever memorable." We no longer render him the homage which his contemporaries felt would even now be his. One likes to feel, however, that theirs was not a mistaken judgment, but perhaps a prophecy. In many ways Hales was for his time peculiarly modern; he was one of those free thinkers who belong both to their own age and to a far-distant time; one of those whose ideas, when the years that form the gap between have been fulfilled, stand revealed in almost startling agreement with contemporary thought. He cannot remain but a dim name in the midst of the chaos of the seventeenth century.

He himself made no effort to win fame either among his contemporaries or from posterity. In the three small volumes which contain his writings there is nothing which was meant to serve more than the immediate occasion. It was only long afterward and with great difficulty

that the few scattered records of his thought were all collected. They consist of seventeen sermons, less than half a dozen small tracts of a few pages each on religious subjects, eight or ten letters to various of his friends, and a series of some thirty-odd letters to Sir Dudley Carlton, the English Ambassador at The Hague, whose chaplain Hales then was and by whom he had been sent to witness the proceedings of the Synod of Dort. He was above all else a scholar, and when we consider, for instance, the nine bulky volumes of his contemporary, Archbishop Laud, a busy executive, his record seems meagre indeed. His little writing was not from lack of power but was due mainly to deliberate choice. His friends urged him to write more, but he as persistently refused. To personal glory he was indifferent, an attitude which constitutes much of his charm. He felt that he could do more good by teaching, by direct contact with people, than by writing. He deplored the mass of controversial literature of his day. He realized that many of his own opinions were not those commonly held, and he wished to avoid any possibility of injury that might result from obtruding them upon others. Not only did he refrain from writing but he would not accept high position in either the universities or the Church. By choice he passed most of his life in scholarly retirement at Eton College, where he might, as he said on one occasion when expressing his preference, have "a small, a private, a retired Auditory."

Yet no man was accorded greater praise than he by a wide circle of learned and influential friends. The Earl of Clarendon spoke of him as "one of the least men in the kingdom and one of the greatest scholars in Europe." He marvelled at his preferring to live at Eton when his learning and ability were such as to have gained for him, had he so wished, any position within the gift of the Church. He praised his profound

judgment and his discerning spirit, and remarked that he had read more and retained more in his memory than any man he knew except Lord Falkland, who he thought "sided him." The two men, Hales and Falkland, thus placed together by Clarendon, were themselves intimate friends. They were much alike in spirit. Anthony à Wood gave Hales a high place among his Oxford worthies. On one occasion he applied to him the epithet, "a walking library," and on another, when speaking of the life of John Donne by Isaac Walton, the greatest praise he could give the book was to say that Hales, "the best critic of the last age," had approved of it. Stillington, Bishop of Worcester, in praising his wisdom, judgment, and moderation, spoke of him as "that incomparable man." Dr. Heylin, Laud's biographer, called him a "man of infinite reading and no less ingenuity, free of discourse, and as communicative of his knowledge as the celestial bodies of their light and influence." Andrew Marvel, a man of opposite religious views, counted it "no small honor to have grown up into some part of his [Hales'] acquaintance, and to have conversed awhile with the living remains of one of the clearest heads and best-prepared breasts in Christendom." Bishop Pearson, of Chester, long Hales' friend, described him as "a man of as great sharpness, quickness, and subtilty of wit, as ever this or perhaps any nation bred." "His industry did strive," he said, "if it were possible, to equal the largeness of his capacity, whereby he became as great a master of polite, various, and universal learning, as ever yet conversed with books."

None of these men could find terms strong enough, seemingly, in which to express their admiration for Hales. Yet while many of their names are today household words with us, he of whom they thus spoke is almost entirely forgotten. If what they said of him was true, and we do not doubt their testimony in other matters,



he too was a force in his generation. His was the quiet radiation of a luminous personality, a direct man-to-man influence, with only the intangible result of more threads of pure gold woven into the fabric of the lives of those who knew him. To catch again the full vision of such a life is difficult indeed, yet such is the charm of even a few bright gleams, that, as a child that seeks the end of the rainbow, one is led irresistibly on in the hope of discovering the full brightness of the treasures of mind and heart which endeared Hales to his contemporaries.

He was born at Bath in 1584. His father was John Hales, who acted as steward to the Horner family in Somersetshire. At Bath he was educated in "grammar learning," in the phrase of Anthony à Wood, and at thirteen, he went to Oxford, where he became a scholar of Corpus Christi. Finally in 1605, when he was twenty-one, as that old worthy quaintly continues, "the prodigious pregnancy of his parts being discovered by the Hedge beaters of Sir Henry Savile, he was encouraged to stand for a Fellowship at Merton." Although the competition was strong and all the candidates "sifted and examined to the utmost," he stood easily first among those appointed. One is not surprised that he did if Wood's testimony be true that certain seniors at Oxford, at his (Wood's) first coming there, told him that no one "in the then memory of man" ever went beyond him for "subtle Disputations in Philosophy, for his eloquent Declamations and Orations; as also for his exact knowledge in the Greek tongue." He proceeded M.A. in 1609. For a time he was lecturer in Greek at Merton, and in 1612 was made public university lecturer in the same subject. Part at least of Wood's praise of him must have been well founded. During the years from 1610 to 1613 were published the volumes of Sir Henry Savile's fine edition of Chrysostom. Savile was at this time warden of Merton. He had been the first to recog-

nize Hales' ability and to secure his promotion. It was he whom he chose to help him in his great work of editing the eloquent Greek Father. Hales' own joy in the task and the extent to which he shared the spirit of the author, are evident from the numerous references to Chrysostom in his own later sermons.

In 1596, without giving up the wardenship of Merton, Savile had been made provost of Eton College. As a part of the Eton foundation were a number of Fellowships designed for the support of resident scholars, men of mature and recognized ability, who would thus have leisure amid congenial surroundings to carry on their researches. They also shared the common life and work of the college. Each college was proud of the record of the scholars whom it could thus permanently attach to itself. Although Sir Henry was, as Wood curiously laments, "troubled with the cumbrances of marriage," he desired to improve the college of which he was the head with "riches and literature." Accordingly in 1613, as one step toward the latter end, he made his young Oxford assistant one of the Fellows of Eton. To Hales the appointment was peculiarly pleasing. Besides continuing his intimate and happy companionship with the older scholar, it afforded him just that measure of seclusion which his modest yet industrious soul most craved. He felt that he could do more good through his researches than by accepting a position involving wide pastoral duties. The money reward of more active work made no appeal to him. Clarendon quoted him as saying on one occasion that his Fellowship and the place of bursar, which he also filled at Eton, brought him fifty pounds a year more than he could spend. Yet their combined income was very small. His only personal extravagance was books. His library was valued at twenty-five hundred pounds, and was, in Aubrey's phrase, "a noble one and judiciously chosen."

Clarendon considered it the best private library he had ever seen. It is with Eton that Hales' name is always associated. There were passed the busy, mature years of his life, from the time when he was twenty-nine until he was sixty-five. From his activity there not only many generations of Eton boys but men of eminence in England and on the Continent came to know and admire him.

We have noted the high place assigned him as a critic and as a scholar. Although his refusal to write more has kept us from having anything like a complete record of his thought, still the bits which we do possess, miscellaneous and disconnected as they are, furnish indisputable evidence of his intellectual power.

We have for one thing considerable light on the methods by which he did his work. They were strikingly like those of modern scholars. He disclosed them in the talks which from time to time he gave to the boys of Eton, who we think must have been decidedly proud of the quiet but famous little scholar who dwelt among them. Interests primarily religious did not, in his view, excuse one from the labor of critical scholarship. "Piety," he affirmed, "doth not require us to be either short-witted or beggarly." On the contrary, St. Paul himself expressly forbade "greenness of scholarship." Moreover, as he put it with unconsciously humorous emphasis, in interpreting the Scriptures rightly "that which here gives us the victory must be the grace of God and our own industry." He knew the value of systematic work. He was fond of quoting the advice of a former scholar who had said that if a man had thirty years in which to acquire knowledge, he might with greater profit use twenty of them in learning how to study than to spend the entire period in diligent but unregulated work. On the other hand he warned them against securing exactness at the sacrifice of things more worth while. Quoting



Quintilian, he declared that it ought not impeach the learning of a good Grammarian to be ignorant of some things, since there were many "unnecessary quilllets and quirks in Grammar, of which to purchase the knowledge were but loss of labor and time." The difficulties which beset the path of the real student he never underestimated. Knowledge he declared to be indeed a very pleasant thing to possess, but the process of learning was, he warned them, "harsh and tedious above all things else in the world." By knowledge he meant not merely knowing what others had put into books, but the attainment of ultimate truth as far as that was humanly possible.

The earnestness with which he himself sought to reach this high goal is evident from a passage of remarkable beauty in a letter he wrote to Archbishop Laud.

"The pursuit of truth," [he said], "hath been my only care, ever since I first understood the meaning of the word. For this, I have forsaken all hopes, all friends, all desires, which might biass me, and hinder me from driving right at what I aimed. For this I have spent all my money, my means, my youth, my age and all that I have; that I might remove from myself that censure of Tertullian, *Suo vitio quis quid ignorat?* If with all this cost and pains, my purchase is but error; I may safely say, to err hath cost me more than it has many to find the truth: and truth itself shall give me this testimony at last, that if I have missed of her, it is not my fault but my misfortune."

What pretended to be truth, he told the students, must be diligently weighed and sifted. He loved Epicharmus' maxim that "The chiefest sinew and strength of wisdom is not easily to believe." This attitude, now particularly dear to the historian, is further emphasized in one of his letters. A friend who was about to undertake the guidance of a young gentleman in the study of Roman history, wrote to him for advice. His answer, printed now as a tract with the title *The Method of Reading Profane History*, reveals not only a wide knowledge of the literature of Roman history but also

a surprising grasp of scientific methods of procedure in its study; such things as due attention to geography and chronology, the critical emendation and comparison of texts, tests of the accuracy and good faith of authors, reliance upon primary sources, orderly methods of taking notes, in fact most of the things which only in the last seventy years have come to be generally recognized as the bulwarks of historical scholarship.

What are the results of his untiring and surprisingly scientific search for truth as shown by his conclusions in regard to the big problems of his own day? Those of which we have fullest record concern the religious situation, one of the two vital issues about to plunge the nation into civil war. Here his intellectual power is abundantly evident, though he did not succeed in solving the vexed problem. His fundamental fallacy, one common to the majority of men in his day, Anglican and Puritan alike, was his belief in the close connection between Church and State. A Royalist in politics, he believed that a single Church organization under the king's control and in religious sympathy with him was a political necessity. He feared that were private unauthorized religious meetings allowed, they might serve as a cloak for treasonable attempts against the sovereign; hence his acquiescence in Laud's severe policy of enforced conformity. He held at the same time views as to the freedom and independence of the individual which are in our opinion a direct denial of the rightfulness of such a policy. He sought to reconcile the two positions by a scheme of comprehension—a single Church which would make provision for individual differences. This was not his idea alone but was common to a whole group of Anglican liberalists. His position was unique in the greater stress which he laid upon the need for individualism and the extent to which, accordingly, he would have altered existing doctrine and practice.

As authoritative sources for the determination of religious truth, he would acknowledge nothing except Scripture and reason; "beyond these two," as he said on one occasion, "I have no ground for my Religion, neither in Substance nor in Ceremony." This was a bold position. It meant the possible rejection of the precepts of one's early training, of usages sanctioned by age or by universality, of decrees of national churches and of general councils, all of which, as he proved in a series of masterly expositions, were but the expressions of man's authority only. To none of these, therefore, belonged infallibility. On the contrary, the command was laid upon each individual, no matter how lowly, "of what sex, of what rank or degree, and place soever, from him that studies in his Library, to him that sweats at the Plough-tail," to know for himself not only "*what*" he believed but "*wherefore*, upon what reason." Such an injunction of course presupposed freedom of thought and the impossibility of coercing belief. On no subject did Hales express himself more strongly.

"The nature of Truth is such," he explained, "that if the understanding apprehend it for Truth, it cannot but assent unto it. No Man can force himself to believe what he lists, or when he lists." Again, princes "can restrain the *outward man*, and moderate our *outward actions*; by *Edicts* and *Laws* they can tie our *hands* and our *tongues*; Thus far they can go, and when they are gone thus far, they can go no farther; But to rule the *inward man*, in our *hearts* and *souls*, to set up an Imperial throne in our understandings and wills, this part of our government belongs to *God* and to *Christ*. . . . Men may be kings of Earth and Bodies, but Christ alone is King of Spirits and Souls." Wherefore, "if Secular Princes stretch out the skirts of their Authority to command ought by which our souls are prejudiced, the King of Souls hath in this case given us a greater command, 'That we *rather obey God then men*.'"

With individualism in belief thus given free range, how then, one asks, could there be any unity at all, any scheme of comprehension, however broad? His answer,



and that of the others of this group, was that there were certain fundamental Christian truths so clearly set down in Scripture that no one not of evil mind could fail to recognize them. Here we grant that their psychology was at fault, for unanimity even on a single point is not so readily attained. But of such a possibility they did not have a doubt. In the fundamentals only was belief to be required. All other points of belief, those not fully explained in Scripture or those based on passages the meaning of which was ambiguous, were from their very nature non-essentials. Here, since men's powers of interpretation differed, their conclusions must inevitably be different. That such was the case was wholly negligible, provided men did not make them a ground of separation or try to force them upon others. Opposite opinions of the same thing might even, Hales thought, be of such a nature that both might not only be held without offence, but profitably taught. "It is," he said, "*unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace*, and not *Identity of conceit*, which the Holy Ghost requires at the hands of Christians."

He also interpreted belief even in the fundamentals much more broadly than did most of the men of his day. In his classification of "weak Christians," all of whom were to be received into the Church, he included men of upright lives who perchance knew little or nothing of Christ. This somewhat startling position was at least partly due, I fancy, to his love of the classics and of the men of ancient days. The Holy Spirit, he affirmed, had endowed the "famous Ethnicks," as he called them, with "Natural Wisdom and Moral discretion." All the good which such men accomplished, and others like them at present, so-called "moral men," was a part of God's will written in their hearts. In so far as they acted conscientiously, they acted like Christians, and were to be received as such. "Two parts there are," he explained,

“that do compleatly make up a *Christian* man, A true *Faith*, and an honest *Conversation*.” The first part might seem the “worthier” since it gave us the name of Christians, but the second was the “surer.”

His view of the ritual of public worship was an application of the distinction made in matters of belief. Only those parts of the service which rested on essential beliefs were of fundamental importance. Here no error could be tolerated by the worshipper. All other observances, based as they were upon elements of belief which were not essential to salvation, were in their turn matters really of indifference. Here to him and to all those who desired comprehension, was the solution of the English situation. The Anglican Church, they felt, was without error in the fundamentals and hence in the parts of her ritual based on them. In other phases, either of her creed or her ritual, individuals might conceivably and possibly rightly differ from her, but since such matters were of minor importance, other views concerning them did not justify their holders in separating from her communion, or in refusing to join in forms of worship other than they might personally have desired. Such conformity was, in their view, but a small price to pay for peace and for political safety. Hales himself would have liked to see the Church take the further step of so simplifying her ritual that it should contain nothing which was not based on a fundamental belief. Then indeed, he felt, would be removed the last conceivable barrier to the common worship of all Christians. “Why may I not,” he reasoned, “go to an Arian Church, so there be no Arianism express in their Liturgy?”

To a man with these views, the bitterly antagonistic attitude toward one another expressed by the various religious sects of his day seemed utterly needless and wrong. “You shall not find,” he exclaimed, “two things of more different countenance and complexion, than that Christ-

ianity which is commended unto us in the writings of the Apostles and Evangelists, and that which is current in use and practise of the times." The Church's story he called an "*Index of Controversies*." With all the earnestness of his nature he prayed that God might truly come to be with those to whom was committed the waging of controversies, that He might like Lazarus "drop one cooling drop into their Tongues, and Pens too, too much exasperated each against other." If this were not possible, he hoped the end of the world might speedily come. Had all men possessed his generous nature, his widely tolerant attitude, his depth of spiritual vision, the bitterness of hatred culminating in civil war would not have been. He was truly the prophet of what Charles Beard calls "that Reformation of Erasmus that is yet to be."

Religion, however, was not his only interest. His letters, even the few of them which we possess, disclose a wide range of secular studies. They also incidentally throw a curious light upon intellectual development in the seventeenth century.

He was so much an Egyptologist that a famous traveller and scientist, Mr. John Greaves, who had just returned from measuring the Pyramids, sent him his book on the subject for criticism. Although Hales modestly attributed his doing so more to his affection than to his judgment, his reply reveals the keenly critical interest of the scholar. He wished that Mr. Greaves had included in the book a topographical map of the Nile in the region of the Pyramids in order that he might the better test the conclusion of

"a learned gentleman of Bavaria, Johannes Fredericus Herwart, who in the XXI Chapter of his *Admiranda Ethnicae Theologicae Mysteria*, endeavors to take off from the founders of those stupendous buildings the scandal of folly and madness, which in the common judgment of the world, hath stuck upon them; and would



persuade us that the Pyramids are monuments of the singular wisdom of the raisers of them, and of wondrous use and benefit to the country, in maintaining the banks of that part of the river upon which the city of Memphis stands, which otherwise were in danger to be swept away by the unruly eruptions of the river, if it were not checked by those wonderful structures."

Whether he accepted either of these somewhat startling interpretations, we cannot tell; in the letter he showed the wisdom of suspended judgment, and was anxious to learn Mr. Greaves' opinion on the subject. He also wondered whether he were right in concluding that the Sphinx "is not of such moment as many report," since Mr. Greaves did not in his book "do it so much honour as to name it."

Mr. William Oughtred, a famous mathematician, was his intimate friend. A few days after one of his visits to Eton, Hales wrote a letter thanking him for a number of solutions he had given him, but explaining that he could not quite agree with one of them, a demonstration concerning the "projectures of an oblique circle." His reasoning shows him to have been no mean mathematician, but with the humility of the true scholar, he added, "If I take upon me to dispute with you, it is but only to learn, and learn I cannot of you except I betray my ignorance unto you." At the same time he returned by Mr. Oughtred's servant his "little compendium of triangles" by which he confessed himself "much eased." The grace and courtesy of the letter are charming, and Mr. Oughtred must indeed have valued his "true, plain, and loving friend, John Hales," as the latter signed himself in closing.

Upon matters of conduct, especially those involving a knowledge of historical precedent, his judgment was much sought. Two letters, one to a man and the other to a woman, were answers to queries concerning the rightfulness of usury, a practice at that time of much doubt.

He acknowledged that "traffic, and merchandise, and all dealings in stock of money, will utterly fail if way be not given to usury: and therefore in commonwealths, and so in ours, the moderate use of it by law is to be rated." John Calvin, he said, was the first good man "from the beginning of the world" that ever sanctioned the practice, and if all abided within the limits set by him, he admitted that no harm would result. He personally wished, however, that Calvin "had been pleased to conceal his conceit," since the multitude was likely to ignore such limitations. And he regretfully added, "What shall we say to God himself, who everywhere decries it! What unto all good men, both Ethnic and Christian, who for many hundred years have still protested against it?" Another man wished to know whether it were lawful for first cousins to marry. He replied in the affirmative, and supported his views with an astounding array of authorities—the Bible, the Church Fathers, the Romans, and ten Church councils.

Apparently no subject was considered too abstruse for him to solve. One letter of distinctly seventeenth-century flavor is a reply to an "Honourable Person," whose rank, from the tone of the letter, must have been high, who had written to ask his opinion of "a new-devised cure of wounds, by applying the salve to the weapon that did the mischief." Hales' answer affords us a curious glimpse into the mind of a man gradually freeing himself from mediæval superstition, but yet fully aware of the weight of arguments which his opponents might plausibly offer. It is evident that he considered the notion of weapon-salve utterly ridiculous, nevertheless he marshalled his forces after the usual method of the schools, and discussed the matter with all fulness and dignity. The supposed antiquity of the "cure" he discredited by connecting it with a "merry gullery" of the times, the so-called "Brethren of the Rosie Cross," a

school of quack scientists who claimed to be followers of Paracelsus. Their alleged proofs of the efficacy of weapon-salve based on the usual authorities, reason, Scripture, and experience, he proceeded to demolish by sane common-sense arguments upon which not even a modern scientist could improve. But right in their midst are two curiously mediæval touches. The Scriptural argument propounded did not, as he plainly demonstrated, support the weapon-salve theory, but it did, as he warned his correspondent, place its authors in danger of prosecution by the Court of High Commission for attributing to so-called scientific forces the miracle-working power of Elisha's bones. That he himself believed in miracles there can be no doubt. He referred to them repeatedly. Christ and the Apostles used them, he said, to prove that they were of God, and under similar circumstances they would be necessary now. The transitional stage of his thinking is apparent, however, from the fact that the reasons he gave for accepting them are in line with those by which now similar events become only natural phenomena. Why should we let this matter of miracles trouble us so much, he asked on one occasion; "Seems it unto us a greater miracle that our Saviour once turn'd a little water into wine, then every year in so many Vine-trees to turn that into wine in the branches, which being received at the root was mere water? Or why was it more wonderful for Him once to feed five thousand with five loaves, then every year to feed the whole world by the strange multiplication of a few seeds cast into the ground?"

Wholly without any modern trend, however, was his statement that if weapon-salve were possible, a position he did not once grant, its potency would proceed from supernatural powers. It was in all seriousness that he affirmed that "*Spirits*, by reason of the *subtilty* of *their nature* and long experience, know certainly *more*



*mysteries* in nature then we do." In the same vein he condemned the Greeks for consulting the oracle at Delphi, on the ground that "*Apollo* was the *Devil*." In one of his sermons too we see evidence of his belief in supernatural agencies when he quoted the experience of miners, who often on returning to the mine in the morning found their work of the previous day all in confusion, owing to the mischievous pranks of the spirits which dwell in the minerals. A Puritan contemporary, Flavel, was accused by Wood of plagiarizing from him. It was this story of the mine gnomes that he stole. On another occasion Hales quoted from a book on meteors the fact that before a storm a great noise is often heard "which is the banding of good and evil Angels, the one striving to annoy us with tempests, the other striving to preserve us from the danger of them." Yet he was perhaps more scientific and less credulous than any man of his age.

It was not, however, for his intellectual acumen, the clarity of his theological vision, his scientific interests, or his accumulation of mediæval lore, that men loved him most, but for the rare charm of his personality. Bishop Pearson, after recounting his high intellectual gifts, almost burst out with, "and had he never understood a letter, he had other ornaments sufficient to indear him. For he was of a nature (as we ordinarily speak) so kind, so sweet, so courting all mankind, of an affability so prompt, so ready to receive all conditions of men, that I conceive it near as easy a task for anyone to become so knowing, as so obliging." To Anthony à Wood the gentleness and sweetness of his disposition were the more marked in that, in his opinion, those were qualities which, as he said, "seldom accompany hard students and critics." Although Hales seemed utterly unconscious of possessing such attributes himself, he well understood their value in others. Moreover, on reading his analysis

of "goodness," one cannot help feeling that he is indeed revealing the motive force of his own life. Goodness he defined as "*a soft, and sweet, and flexible disposition,*" more to be desired than any other virtue. "For," as he expressed it,

"all other Excellencies and *Eminent qualities* which raise in the minds of men some opinion and conceit of us, may occasion peradventure some strong respect in another kind; but *impression of love* and true *respect*, nothing can give but this. *Greatness of place* and authority may make us fear'd, *Depth of Learning* admired, *Abundance of Wealth* may make men outwardly obsequious unto us; but that which makes one man a *God* unto another, that which *doth tie the Souls* of Men unto us, that which like the *Eye of the Bridegroom*, in the *Book of Canticles*, *ravishes the heart of him that looks upon it*, is *Goodness*:" . . . Of all our qualities, goodness is *most available to Humane Society*. . . . All other *Qualities*, how excellent soever they are, seem to be somewhat of a *melancholick* and solitary disposition. But *Goodness* is more sociable; and rejoyceth in equalling others unto itself, and loses its nature, when it ceases to be *communicable*."

The value he put upon goodness in this sense is evident from the emphasis he continually gave it. He loved to dwell upon the goodness of God. Severity, he held, was a quality not natural with Him, but only casual, and unto which, as he expresses it, "He is constrained besides His nature." Comparing God to a person, he described His countenance as "fair as the Sun in its strength; no frown, no wrinkle in His forehead." In almost ecstatic exaltation he cried out, "When He created this beautiful frame of Heaven and Earth, Men, and Angels, and in that wonderful order, who counselled Him?" Christ's acts upon earth were all, he said, but the issues of His tenderness. He saw no purpose in that which was harsh and ugly. He marvelled that man had been given the faculty of anger, since he really had so little use for it! Duelling, for instance, he said could be justified only by texts from the Old Testa-

ment, since the Apostles could not think of Christians shedding one another's blood. In a sermon preached to the boys at Eton he curiously remarked that "*It hath been observed of the Ancient Cornish Language, that it afforded no forms of Oathes, no phrases to swear in.*" Said he, "I should never think our Language the poorer, if it were utterly destitute of all forms and phrases of reviling and opprobrious speech." It is so useless, "that except a man did love a vice for its own sake, he can give no reason why he doth affect it." Its only supposed use, he continued, was in reproof or in administration of justice, but neither require it, as both may better be performed without it. Good words were as cheap as bad ones and far more effective. Thereupon he told the story of the north wind and the sun in their race to deprive a man of his coat. Repeatedly in his sermons, which with their formalism, their Latin and Greek, their mention of long-forgotten names, would sound queer indeed to modern boys of sixteen, does one find these bright gleams of rare human kindness.

But with all his gentleness there was in him no lack of virility. It was to the strength of men that he continually appealed. "Even the natural man," he said, quoting a heathen historian, "is a creature of great strength, and if at any time he find himself weak, it is through his fault, not through his nature." As for the Christian, strength was his birthright. Quoting the words "I can do all things," he exclaimed, "These words are Anakims . . . he that hath a right unto them must be one of the race of Giants at least." There would be difficulties enough to overcome, for "it is a hard way that leads to life." But there was the test of the man. There was, he held, a martyrdom even in time of peace. If a man's faith was to save him, he must be ever ready to lay down his life for it. He who would have failed under temptation was lost, even though no temptation



came to him. In his view, it was entirely possible for men, if they so willed, to live without sin. Why, he asked, should any man think otherwise and so discourage himself from what he termed "the happiest experiment in the world"? He was aware, he said, that many did not agree with him and lived accordingly, but he would have all under his charge "hold it possible," and "live as if they meant to prove it." He had no patience with the kind of religion that, as he said, might be compared to a "quotidian Ague; it comes by fits; every day it takes us, and every day it leaves us." All work of whatever nature ought to be in a large sense religious in character, for, he maintained, "whoever labors not with God *is idle*, how busie soever he may seem to be in the world." Living and devotion were to him synonymous terms. The motive force of a godly life was a right mental attitude, to maintain which constant prayer was essential. Its exercise need not interfere with whatever else one might be doing. "For the mind of man," he explained with somewhat naïve psychology, "is a very agile and nimble substance, and it is a wonderful thing to see how many things it will at one moment apply itself unto without any confusion or lett." Thus only through the control of sinful thought could one maintain the inner purity of life. Enormities, the greater sins, were the temptations of comparatively few. It was the multitude of lesser sins that most men had really to fear. To cast the blame of one's sins upon the Devil was shirking, for the fault lay rather with one's self. "I doubt not," he said, "if we would but shut up our wills, and use that grace of God which is offered, but a great part of this suggesting power of his would fall to nothing." Self-indulgence he condemned with a sternness that was almost more than Puritanical. He regularly fasted from "Thursday dinner to Saturday." Eating too much was, he held, a vice, and the

root of many of the worst evils. All feasts in memory of the saints he abhorred. Out of his asceticism grew doubtless his queer mediæval theory as to the nature of the body after the resurrection. It was to look outwardly just as it does now; but since in heaven there could be neither hunger nor thirst, there would be no eating there, and the new body would lack all the organs that eating renders necessary. Certainly, here was an antithesis of the Mohammedan view of Heaven! He was too sensitive, however, too much the Humanist, to banish harmless pleasure or beauty from the world. "To refresh his spirits," he used canary to a moderate degree. Aubrey found him, when he visited him shortly before his death, clad in a "violet-coloured cloth gown with buttons and loops." "He wore not a black gown," explained Aubrey. The soft bright color was evidently more pleasing to him. His æsthetic sense also found expression in an almost child-like play of fancy. Particularly was this true of his appreciation of nature. "Who is not moved," he cried, "with that Parable of *Jotham*, in the Book of *Judges*, that the trees went forth to choose a king?" It underlay his fondness for parables in general. He rejoiced that Christ had filled the Gospels with them. He had made them, he said, like Divine and Christian *Aesop's Fables*, because he found it to be exceeding profitable. Much of his own teaching power resulted from his use of vivid illustration.

His love of humanity was so wide and deep that with prophetic vision he seemed almost to forecast the trend of modern social movements, to picture indeed an era of co-operative effort along all lines, the possibility of which we in our day are just beginning to realize. His sense of such possibilities made him like to read about the much-condemned "Familists." The emphasis which they placed upon the common brotherhood of man and upon mutual responsibility greatly appealed to him.

He was wont to say, according to Aubrey, "that sometime or other those fine notions would take in the world." "No man," he maintained, "is born only for his own good, but for the good of his friends, for the good of his country, and for millions more beside himself." In religion this view meant the responsibility of laymen. "Every one of you," he told his hearers, "hath cure of Souls, either of his child, or his servant, or his friend, or of his neighbor; and if any of these perish through your default, his blood shall be required at your hands." In matters of material betterment also he had a keen sense of common obligation. Of worldly wealth it was his firm belief that one should keep only enough for the necessities; the rest was a trust to be administered for the good of others. Over-carefulness in giving was, he felt, apt to defeat its own purpose. "How many occasions of Christian charity," he lamented, "do we let slip when we refuse to give our alms, unless we first cast doubts, and examine the persons, their lives, their necessities, though it be onely to reach out some small thing, which is due unto him, whatsoever it be." The common practice was "like to the Sun in winter, long ere it rise, and quickly gone." Of his own small store of wealth he gave liberally. When as bursar of the college he received bad money, he always substituted for it his own money, a practice which often resulted in an outlay of as much as twenty or thirty pounds at a time. Poor students walking to Oxford received help from him as they passed through Eton. He was the common godfather of all the children of Eton. As he walked from there to Windsor, it was pretty to see, said Aubrey, how they fell on their knees and asked his blessing. All the groats he received as bursar he saved for them and by the time he reached Windsor bridge he usually had none left. Pleasing pictures, these, of him who had termed "goodness" the quality "most available to humane

society, and that which doth tie the souls of men to us"! They accord with the tribute paid him at his death, that the poor did him more honor than the rich. Such was Hales, the man.

That his friends did not fail to appreciate these qualities in him is evident from the few delightful glimpses that we fortunately have of him as he appeared among them. Clarendon described him as being "not in the least degree inclined to melancholy, but on the contrary of a very open and pleasant conversation; and therefore very well pleased with the resort of his friends to him, who were such as he had chosen, and in whose company he delighted, and for whose sake he would sometimes, once a year, resort to London only to enjoy their cheerful conversation." In the works of the dashing Cavalier poet, Sir John Suckling, is a letter in verse with no name on it, beginning:—

"Whether these lines do find you out,  
Putting or clearing of a doubt,  
(Whether predestination,  
Or reconciling three in one,  
Or the unriddling how men die,  
And live at once eternally,  
Now take you up) know 'tis decreed  
You strait bestride the colledge steed:  
Leave *Socinus* and the Schoolmen  
(Which Jack Bond swears do but fool men)  
And come to town. . . ."

There are forty-one lines of it, all in similar strain. It is evidently a whimsically phrased yet earnest invitation to Hales to leave his studies for awhile and come to London. For there in a day he may have as much news "as serves all Windsor for a year" and partake of

"Dishes, with names not known in books,  
And lesse amongst the colledge cooks."



His friends, who also strove to be "masters of truth, as victory" would be the gainers, for where he came "a Synod might as easily erre." In his Session of the Poets, Suckling furnishes another characteristic picture of him.

"Hales set by himself most gravely did smile,  
To see them about nothing keep such a coile,  
Apollo had spied him, but knowing his mind,  
Past by and called Falkland that sate just behind."

Nicholas Rowe, the first biographer of Shakespeare, relates in his Preface an incident which reveals Hales' independence as a critic, a trait which must have been much relished by at least part of these literary men. Sir John Suckling, a professed admirer of Shakespeare, a position then requiring much courage, was defending him to Ben Jonson, another member of the group. Hales, who sat quietly by, listening, finally remarked that if Shakespeare had not read the ancients, as Jonson affirmed, he had likewise not stolen anything from them. Thereupon he challenged Jonson to produce any topic fully treated by the ancients upon which he could not show something at least as well written by Shakespeare. We have already noticed his friendship for the scientists, Mr. Greaves and Mr. Oughtred, for Sir Henry Savile, and Lord Falkland. Among his younger friends was William Chillingworth, whose book *The Religion of Protestants a safe Way to Salvation*, at once gave its author the position of the greatest controversialist of his age. Hales helped him write it. Indeed, during a period of twenty years of Hales' life, from 1619 to 1638, Anthony à Wood, who looked only for the objective facts of life, found nothing to record of him except his friendship for Chillingworth. Hales' own mention of Chillingworth is a whimsical one. A friend had asked him for one of his books. Hales was sorry that he could not "pleasure" him, since his good friend Mr. Chillingworth, "a gentleman that borrows books in haste, but

restores them with advice," had gotten it into his hands, and he scarcely expected to see it again, particularly since it was the second time he had borrowed it. No man, he said, had ever borrowed the same book twice of him and restored it. Clarendon observed, curiously, that Chillingworth was only a little taller than Hales, and added, by way of parenthesis, that "it was an age in which there were many great and wonderful men of that size." Another "little" friend of Hales was Archbishop Laud. The liberalism of Hales' tract on *Schism and Schismatics* had at once alarmed Laud. He sent for him to come to see him at Lambeth. They spent the entire day in earnest conversation. Later Hales wrote Laud a letter in which he disclaimed any purpose of disturbing the peace of the Church, restated his views, but did not disavow their essential tolerance. Not long afterward Laud appointed Hales one of his own chaplains and Canon of Windsor, a position he held, without giving up that at Eton, from 1639 until the outbreak of the war. That Laud should on investigation thus signally honor Hales is not surprising. Although in natural tendencies two men were never more unlike, for practical purposes they were agreed, since both believed that comprehension supplied that unity in religion on which in their view political safety depended. With all its terrible grimness there was a more pleasing side to Laud's nature; this recognition of the Eton scholar was one of its all too infrequent manifestations. Hales was already past middle age and well known. Now a still wider circle grew to appreciate his genial presence, for Wood tells us that "when the King and the Court resided at Windsor he was much frequented by Noblemen and Courtiers, who delighted much in his company, not for his severe and retired Walks of Learning, but for his polite Discourse, Stories, and Poetry, in which last, 'tis supposed, he was excellent."

For many happy, busy years thus lived Hales, the guide of Eton boys, and the friend of scholars, poets, and noblemen, all of whom, no matter how widely different their interests, found that in him which called forth their admiration and their love. Then the monster of civil war descended upon England; the quiet, gentle scholar was turned out of the position he had so graced by the Long Parliament, which claimed curiously, though conscientiously, that it did so in the name of religion. Such was Hales' hold upon men, however, that even those of the victorious party felt no personal animosity toward him. Penwarden, the Presbyterian divine who was chosen to succeed him at Eton, insisted on returning the Fellowship to him. He, however, refused to accept as a favor from Parliament what it had denied as a right. After the war, Andrew Marvel, one of the most redoubtable fighters in the Puritan ranks, counted it "not one of the least ignominies of that age," as he said, "that so eminent a person of the Church of England (as Hales was) should have been by the iniquity of the times reduced to those necessities under which he lived."

It was indeed a hard lot that he had to bear for the remaining seven years of his life. The Sedleian family of Kent offered him one hundred pounds a year, two horses, and a servant's diet. "But he," said Wood, "being wedded to a retired and studious life, refused to accept this generous (!) offer." To us it is small wonder that he, the wisest scholar of his time, should refuse a servant's place in a nobleman's family. Wood, however, mentioned the matter with no disparagement, but, with somewhat of surprise, continued by saying that soon afterward he accepted a position as tutor, at one-fourth the salary formerly offered, in the family of one Madame Salter near Eton. He was to instruct her son Will, "but he being blockish," said Wood, "Hales could do nothing upon him." Poor Will! He must have been dull indeed if

such a master failed to make an impression. We almost doubt Wood's testimony; for in his will Hales left all his Greek and Latin books (except *St. Jerome*, reserved for another friend) to his "most deservedly beloved friend, Wm. Salter," together with five pounds for a "fair seal ring of gold, engraven with his arms and hatchments doubled and mantled, to preserve the memory of his poor deceased friend." However, when the act was passed by Parliament, forbidding any one to harbor Royalists—malignants, as they were called—Hales refused to endanger the Salters by staying longer. In the town of Eton, opposite the churchyard, lived Hannah Powney, the widow of one of his old servants. Thither he went to lodge. Wood spoke of her as "very careful and respectful to him, as having formerly at her marriage received of his bounty"—another glimpse of Hales' kindly generosity. Aubrey, who visited Hales some seven years later, shortly before his death, has left us an even more pleasing picture of her. "She had been handsome," he said, and was "of good understanding and cleanly," a woman "primitively good and deserving to be remembered." People who were "primitively good" were sure to be discerned by a penetrating spirit like Hales, and by him honored, no matter what their rank. Hannah lived, to follow Aubrey's quaint description, in a "handsome, darke old house. The hall above the wainscot, painted cloath, with godly sentences out of the Psalmes, etc., according to the pious custome of old times; a convenient garden and orchard." It was here that Aubrey found him, clad in his violet-colored gown, with its buttons and loops, peacefully reading Thomas à Kempis. We are pleased with this bit of evidence as to the nature of the few books which, as he told Aubrey, he had kept "to wind up his days withal." The rest of his large library he had been forced to sell, receiving for it less than one-third of its value. Yet despite his



straitened circumstances, which were daily growing more so, a situation far from bright for a man of seventy-one, Aubrey could still describe him as "a prettie little man, sanguine, of a cheerful countenance, very gentle and courteous," who, as he was proud to say, "received him with great humanity." Anthony Farindon, one of his earlier protégés, also visited him in these last months of his life. After a "slight and homely dinner" they had gone to walk in the nearby churchyard. With composure Hales spoke of his own death, saying that he was "weary of this uncharitable world." But it was its lack of charity toward others rather than himself that caused his sorrow. His only personal regret seems to have been that he had not more to leave to others. He told Farindon that he did not wish to be buried in the church at Eton, since he was not its founder and could "not now be its benefactor." By his will also, written in the morning of the day on which he died, he indicated as its one binding provision, that "since in his life he had done the Church no service, so he would not that the Church at his death do him any honour." He wished to be buried in the churchyard at Eton, as close as possible to the body of his little godson, Jack Dickinson, a beautifully human touch; his funeral was to be absolutely without the usual ceremonies, "without any sermon, or ringing the bell, or calling the people together." His sense of unworthiness was the outgrowth of his deep humility of spirit, his sorrow, part of his unconscious greatness, not a note of pessimism. Throughout his conversation with Farindon the latter described him as "gravely cheerful." That in these last years when position and worldly wealth, even the little he had enjoyed, were gone, he kept undisturbed the happy serenity of his mind, is not the least among his claims to the title "The Ever Memorable Mr. John Hales."

## KANT'S MORAL THEOLOGY

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The most generally acknowledged mode of apprehending God or argument for his existence, is the Moral. The argument has various forms, of which the more commonly accepted and influential, in its main principles, is that of Kant. Kant emphatically rejected the traditional arguments for the existence of God—the Ontological, Cosmological, and Teleological—as inadequate and invalid. More generally, he rejected or greatly subordinated the theoretical reason in the sphere of religion, and gave primacy to the practical or moral reason. He went far in teaching that the sphere of science and the sphere of religion are separate and independent of each other.

The essence of Kant's moral argument for the being of God, very briefly stated, is as follows: The *Summum Bonum* of rational creatures is composed of two elements, the one superior the other inferior, the one conditioning the other conditioned. The first is virtue; the second is happiness. Practical reason demands obedience to the moral law; and decrees that the obedient, the virtuous, should obtain happiness that is proportionate to their virtue. Then Kant concludes: We must believe in a God who shall do for the virtuous what nature will not do for them and what they cannot do for themselves; who, because of his supreme intelligence and power and rule over nature, shall secure for them the happiness that should fall to their lot. A God is not needed to make men virtuous, but only to make them happy.

They can be virtuous, or acquire moral law and morality, of themselves; they cannot acquire happiness.

There is much interest in observing the course of reasoning by which Kant was led to the rejection of the common scientific or intellectual arguments for the existence of God and of the employment of the theoretic reason in theology, and to placing reliance upon the practical or moral reason alone.

The first fact to be noticed is Kant's view that the theoretic reason does indeed furnish us with the idea of God as the free and intelligent author of all things. This idea, it is said, is a primitive and necessary conception of reason considered as a faculty distinct from sense and understanding and higher. If reason is excited by the understanding or acts in view of its operations, it still produces the idea entirely from itself, it owes nothing in generating the character of the idea to any influence or communication from sense or understanding or any external source. The idea is the "offspring of reason alone" acting according to its "original laws."

But while Kant thus ascribes to the idea of God so eminent an origin and so special a character, he repeatedly and very earnestly denies that we have in the idea any ground for thinking that there is an object corresponding to it. He denies the possibility of passing, by any legitimate intellectual process, from the subjective idea to an objective being. He asserts that it is "a mere innovation of scholastic wisdom to attempt to pick out of an entirely arbitrary idea the existence of the object corresponding to it"; and again, that God is a "perfectly unknown being," "a something of whose existence in itself we have not the least conception." The question whether there is a real God, or whether it is right or permissible to believe in, or practically to assume, his existence, Kant removes entirely from the determination of the intellect and speculative reason. The speculative reason

creates the idea of God, but gives not the least knowledge or assurance of a being answering thereto. It cannot tell that there is such a being; yet also it cannot tell that there is not.

Still, in the view of Kant, though the idea of God, necessitated by the "very nature" of reason, affords no real knowledge of any being beyond its own subjective self, it has yet a very important regulative office. This great office is to give a systematic unity to the productions or objects of the understanding, or to "finish and crown the whole of human knowledge";<sup>1</sup> to cause the divisions and objects of the universe or nature, as these are severally perceived by the understanding or perceived with imperfect synopsis, to appear as if they formed together the creation and systematic construction of a free and intelligent Supreme Being. In short, the idea gives "order and system," a collective unity, to the world; especially a teleological unity, which is the highest mode of unity, making the world seem the "artistic edifice" of a divine Author.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Pure Reason (Müller tr.), p. 515. Reason prescribes "to the understanding the rule of its complete application" (p. 468). It "frees, it may be, the concept of the understanding of the inevitable limitation of a possible experience" (p. 330).

"All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds thence to the understanding, and ends with reason. There is nothing higher than reason, for working up the material of intuition, and comprehending it under the highest unity of thought" (p. 242).

All future quotations from the *Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft* will be made from Müller's revised translation.

<sup>2</sup> "The supposition, therefore, which reason makes of a Supreme Being as the highest cause, is relative only, devised for the sake of the systematical unity in the world of sense, and a mere Something in the idea, while we have no concept of what it may be by itself" (p. 545).

"The ideal of the Supreme Being is . . . nothing but a regulative principle of reason, which obliges us to consider all connection in the world as if it arose from an all-sufficient necessary cause, in order to found on it the rule of a systematical unity necessary according to general laws for the explanation of the world" (p. 498).

"We have not the slightest ground to admit absolutely the object of that idea (to suppose it in itself)" (p. 550).

No experience can ever be adequate to "an extension of our knowledge beyond all limits of experience, till it reaches the existence of a Being which is to correspond to our pure idea" (p. 513).

"The concept of an absolutely necessary Being is a concept of pure reason, that is, a mere idea, the objective reality of which is by no means proved by the fact that reason requires it" (p. 477).



Thus Kant contends that, though we have a primitive and necessary idea of God produced by our reason, yet with the idea we have no knowledge of an objective reality. A very important part of Kant's opposition to a scientific or intellectual knowledge of God is his effort to demonstrate the invalidity of the common "proofs" of the existence of God.

The Ontological proof, which has indeed always been but a roundabout way of begging what was to be proved, Kant considers as invalid, on the general principle that we have no authority to affirm the existence of a being merely from the possession of the conception of such a being.

On the Cosmological proof he remarks: "As soon as we suppose that something exists, we cannot avoid the conclusion that something exists necessarily. On this quite natural, though by no means therefore certain conclusion, rests the whole cosmological argument" (*Pure Reason*, p. 495). "It rests on the apparently transcendental law of causality in nature, that everything *contingent* has its cause, which, if contingent again, must likewise have a cause, till the series of subordinate causes ends in an absolutely necessary cause, without which it could not be complete" (p. 487). But the argument is not cogent. We cannot truly rise from the contingent to the necessary, from the conditioned to the unconditioned, from nature as an effect to a supreme universal cause, having no cause above it.

He thus describes the Teleological or Physico-Theological proof:

"There are everywhere in the world clear indications of an intentional arrangement carried out with great wisdom, and forming a whole indescribably varied in its contents and infinite in extent. . . . The nature of different things could never spontaneously, by the combination of so many means, co-operate towards definite aims, if

these means had not been selected and arranged on purpose by a rational disposing principle, according to certain fundamental ideas."

But we cannot approve of the claims which this argument advances.

"The physico-theological proof can never establish by itself alone the existence of a Supreme Being" (p. 503).

It rests upon the Ontological proof. Kant makes note of a particular defect, as follows:

"According to this argument, the fitness and harmony existing in so many works of nature might prove the contingency of the form, but not of the matter, that is, the substance in the world. . . . The utmost, therefore, that could be established by such a proof would be an *architect of the world*, always very much hampered by the quality of the material with which he has to work, not a *creator*, to whose idea everything is subject. This would by no means suffice for the purposed aim of proving an all-sufficient original Being" (pp. 504, 505).

Kant comes to the general conclusion respecting the classic theistic arguments, that "no satisfactory proof whatever, from merely speculative reason, is possible, in support of the existence of a Being corresponding to our transcendental idea" (p. 499).

But the greatest opposition of Kant to the traditional theistic proofs is in the radical principles of his epistemology or theoretic philosophy. These proofs, especially the cosmological and teleological, have been employed for the most part by their advocates upon the assumption that the apparent universe, the apparent cosmos of space, time, and material realities, is external to and wholly independent of our mind; that all its immeasurable extent and duration, all corporeal objects from the least to the greatest magnitudes, in their motions, interactions, reciprocal adaptations, require a cause, as creator, fabricator, and sustainer, infinitely greater than man and

any combination of men. This external nature of immense extent and duration and of marvellous construction is the ground or affords the premises of the proofs.

Kant would maintain an entirely different view. He holds that the supposed external nature is not external, but is really only internal; that it is a system of phenomena or appearances within the mind and produced by the mind—a system of the mind's own states; that all our knowledge is of phenomena in the mind. In particular, he says that space is nothing outside the mind, but is only an *a priori* form of our thought, is wholly subjective.

"Space does not represent any quality of objects by themselves, or objects in their relation to one another; *i.e.*, space does not represent any determination which is inherent in the objects themselves, and would remain, even if all subjective conditions of intuition were removed" (*Pure Reason*, p. 20). "We maintain that space is nothing, if we leave out of consideration the condition of a possible experience, and accept it as something on which things by themselves are in any way dependent" (p. 22).

He asserts likewise of time, that it is only a form of thought, existing entirely within the mind and produced by the mind.

"Time is not something existing by itself, or inherent in things as an objective determination of them, something therefore that might remain when abstraction is made of all subjective conditions of intuition." "Time is nothing but the form of the internal sense, that is of our intuition of ourselves, and of our internal state" (p. 26).

Kant affirms in general:

"What we call nature is nothing but a whole of phenomena, not a thing by itself, but a number of representations in our soul" (p. 94).

"The understanding . . . is itself the lawgiver of nature, and without the understanding nature, that is, a synthetical unity of the manifold of phenomena according to rules, would be nowhere to be found, because phenomena as such cannot exist without us but exist in our sensibility only" (p. 103). "Everything which is perceived in space

and time, therefore all objects of an experience possible to us, are nothing but phenomena, that is, mere representations, which, such as they are represented, namely, as extended beings or series of changes, have no independent existence outside our thoughts" (p. 400). "If we take away the thinking subject, the whole material world would vanish, because it is nothing but a phenomenon in the sensibility of our own subject, and a certain class of its representations" (p. 310).

In this manner Kant denies or annihilates the universe of space and matter upon which the ordinary theistic proofs have been grounded. The visible universe is not an existence external to the mind and independent of it and possibly the work of a divine cause, but is only an appearance within the mind, and the product, in matter and form, of the mind's faculties of sense, understanding, and reason.

Thus all our knowledge is of phenomena in the mind, subject-objects. But yet Kant plainly asserts the existence of things that are external to or independent of the mind; though they are unknowable, and therefore incapable of being the medium of the cognition of anything else. There are objects that affect our senses and occasion the rise of sensations and perceptions; but the sensations and perceptions or phenomena they occasion in us give us no knowledge of them. We know at most only that they exist. Our knowledge is rather of what they are not than of what they are; for we know that they are not spatial and temporal, because space and time belong only to phenomena and are "met with nowhere except in ourselves" (p. 303). "It must not be supposed," says Kant, "that an idealist is he who denies the existence of external objects of the senses; all he does is to deny that it is known by immediate perception, and to infer that we can never become perfectly certain of their reality by any experience whatsoever" (p. 299). Again: "I certainly admit that there are bodies outside us, that is,



things, which though they are wholly unknown to us, as to what they may be in themselves, we cognise through presentations, obtained by means of their influence on our sensibility." They are "to us unknown, but not the less real."<sup>3</sup>

Though Kant affirms in many plain and positive statements that all our knowledge is of internal appearances, subjective objects, states of the subject, and that nature is the "sum total of all phenomena" and is made by the faculties of the subject, yet he is far from maintaining self-consistency in his utterances. He is found to say: "This present world presents to us so immeasurable a stage of variety, order, fitness, and beauty, whether we follow it up in the infinity of space or in its unlimited division, that even with the little knowledge which our poor understanding has been able to gather, all language, with regard to so many and inconceivable wonders loses its vigour" (*Pure Reason*, p. 500); and speaks of the "wonders of nature and the majesty of the cosmos" (p. 502). In a notable passage he declares: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: *the starry heavens above and the moral law within.*"<sup>4</sup> Again he avers that our belief in a supreme Author of the universe rises to "an irresistible conviction" (*Pure Reason*, p. 502). He says also: "The belief in a great and wise *Author of the world* has been supported entirely by the wonderful beauty, order, and providence, everywhere displayed in nature" (p. 702). Here we have instances of the profound inconsistency and self-contradiction of Kant's exposition. This admired world around us and the starry heavens above are, according to his fundamental teaching, his fundamental idealism,

<sup>3</sup> *Prolegomena* (E. B. Bax tr.), p. 36.

<sup>4</sup> Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* and other Works on the Theory of Ethics, Translated by T. K. Abbott, B.D., p. 260. All citations hereafter from Kant's ethical works will be made from this translation.

not around and above us at all, but wholly inside us. This apparent space of illimitable extent and illimitable division is nothing but a form of our subjective thought, having no existence outside and independent of our mind. All this order, variety, beauty, all these wondrous forms and majesty of nature, have no external being, but are altogether a system of appearances within, and the production of, our "poor understanding." We have not the "slightest ground to admit" the existence of a divine author of the universe. By this mode of reasoning the traditional arguments for the existence of God are by Kant proved invalid, because they are rendered useless and futile. Their ground or their resources are entirely taken away from them. No place is left, no requirement remains, no basis for argument exists, for an objective divine cause and architect of the knowable universe; since it subsists only within the rational creature's mind, and has its full cause in his own faculties of sense and intellect.

By denying the knowableness of realities outside and independent of the mind, and reducing what the generality of men have accepted and treated as a vastly extended and knowable universe to a system of subjective phenomena, he would seem to abandon every ground for arguing to a divine cause except the mind of the rational subject and its productive and constructive processes, and the community of rational subjects. But he does not even retain this much; for he holds that no man knows his own mind as it really is in itself, or the minds of other men as they really are, but only appearances or mental states.<sup>5</sup> Evidently, unknowable mind or minds can form no basis for the inference of any other being. There is

<sup>5</sup> "In no way whatsoever can we know anything of the nature of our soul, so far as the possibility of its separate existence is concerned," etc. (*Pure Reason*, p. 801). "We know ourself as a phenomenon only, and not as it is by itself" (p. 761). "I have no knowledge of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself" (pp. 761, 762).

nothing left then as a ground for argument to any reality distinct from and higher than the mind, save the appearances of the mind and the constructive operations going on with them. It is however a notable fact that Kant seems never to regard the mental phenomena as a worthy or proper ground for arguing to a higher mind as the ultimate author. He generally treats the soul with its faculties or functions as if it were self-existent and self-sustained, requiring no cause beyond itself; treats it as producing the apparent universe, but as itself produced by nothing or as if self-caused.

In excluding from knowledge all things as they exist in themselves, both external things and even the mind itself, and in restricting knowledge to internal phenomena alone, the states or determinations of the mind, Kant exhibits one of the most remarkable spectacles of all philosophical history; namely, the spectacle of a philosopher most strenuously backing off, most resolutely and persistently pulling himself away, from reality. He zealously degrades reality and the knowable to a minimum. He resolves to content himself with a knowledge of internal appearance, of appearance that is to no extent the true appearance or representation of anything.

All goes to show how impossible it was for Kant consistently to hold to a God knowable by intellectual or scientific knowledge. He gave up the traditional arguments for God because of their supposed defects; but he gave up a great deal more than these in abandoning all reality, or knowable reality, independent of our thoughts, upon which an argument might be founded for the existence of a God independent of our thoughts—of a God as an infinite Cause of an external infinite spatial universe and of finite minds, gifted with remarkable endowments or faculties, which were not self-created or self-existent. He very consistently asserts, as was observed above, that “no satisfactory proof from merely

speculative reason is possible in support of a Being corresponding to our transcendental idea."

Yet though Kant thus so decidedly declares the impossibility, on the principles and postulates accepted by him, of a speculative or scientific knowledge of God, he is very far from resigning himself to the theological agnosticism or blank atheism which would seem to be logically involved. He as earnestly and vigorously contends for what he regards as a noble practical theism as he contends against a speculative theism. There is, he still pleads, a genuine and admirable theology; but it has its foundation wholly in the laws of morality ordained by our practical or moral reason.

"All attempts," says Kant, "at a purely speculative use of reason, with reference to theology, are entirely useless and intrinsically null and void, while the principles of their natural use can never lead to any theology, so that unless we depend on moral laws, or are guided by them, there cannot be any theology of reason" (p. 512). He says also: "This moral theology has this peculiar advantage over speculative theology, that it leads inevitably to the concept of a *sole, most perfect, and rational* first Being, to which speculative theology does not even *lead us on*, on objective grounds, much less give us a *conviction* of it" (p. 653).

A primary expedient of Kant, of which note has already been made, is the sharp division of reason, or the employment of reason, into the theoretical or scientific and the practical or moral. He withdraws true theology entirely from the domain of the theoretical reason, and then assigns it to the domain of the practical reason. The theoretical reason is supposed to have no importance for religion. It gives us not the least real help to getting hold upon or discovering the primary object of religion, God; it furnishes no way of passing from the "primitive" and "necessary" idea of God, which it itself produces, to a corresponding object. Only practical reason is of service in apprehending God. In this wise the practical reason



has primacy over the theoretical. Morality, or the law of the moral reason, demands for its own support or its own interests, the postulate of a God as the governor of nature; and on that ground alone, without any theoretic or scientific knowledge, the postulate deserves to be accepted as true. By this scheme Kant fulfils in religion his significant general proposition regarding the objective validity of the ideas of reason: "I had to remove *knowledge* in order to make room for belief" (p. 700).

Kant's division of reason, or the use of reason, into theoretical and practical, and the assignment of primacy to the practical in morality and religion, have had an immense influence upon the subsequent theistic and ethical ontology and epistemology, and seem in latter days to be more influential than ever. This is manifest in the discussions of "Intellectualism" and "Voluntarism"; in the propaganda of "pragmatism"; in the very superior place ascribed to "value-judgments" over intellectual or existential judgments. Practical need, serviceableness, utility, has been given primacy in general ontology and epistemology. It has been avowed that the useful is true, that practical value is the criterion of reality. Says Kaftan: "The relation to the Will and our practical purposes is the sole measure of reality given to us."<sup>6</sup>

From this general view we proceed to consider the peculiar character and course of Kant's moral proof of the existence of God with some special attention, in order to obtain a true idea of its real worth, and to ascertain how well it justifies the great claims made for it by Kant and his followers. The main line of argument runs in this wise: The moral law commands us to make the *summum bonum* the ultimate object of our endeavors. The *summum bonum* consists of two elements, morality or virtue and happiness. Virtue is the "first and principal element" ("it is the worth of the person, and his worthi-

<sup>6</sup> The Truth of the Christian Religion (Ferries tr.), II, p. 289.

ness to be happy"); happiness is the inferior element, it is conditioned by virtue.<sup>7</sup> Practical reason demands that the virtuous — those who are governed by the unselfish and imperative sense of duty — shall obtain a degree of happiness proportionate to their virtue. Now since it is made a duty, a moral necessity, for the finite rational agent to realize and promote the *summum bonum*, it must be possible; but it is not entirely possible for the rational agent himself, because he is not the cause of the world and nature. He cannot then make nature harmonize with his moral mission and facilitate the accomplishment of it. He cannot bring nature to favor him so that he shall receive the degree of happiness he conceives is due his virtue. Besides, unintelligent nature could not of itself distribute happiness in exact proportion to virtue.<sup>8</sup> It is then necessary to believe in the existence of God, a being who is the cause and ruler of nature; who possesses adequate power to control nature so that it shall be in harmony with and promote the interests of morality — the happiness of the virtuous — and possesses the intelligence necessary to understand the true relation between virtue and happiness, or the exact correspondence happiness should have to virtue. This is the substance of Kant's moral proof of the existence of God. In brief,

<sup>7</sup> "Virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of the *summum bonum* in a person, and the distribution of happiness in exact proportion to morality (which is the worth of the person, and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes the *summum bonum* of a possible world; hence this *summum bonum* expresses the whole, the perfect good, in which, however, virtue as the condition is always the supreme good, since it has no condition above it; whereas happiness, while it is pleasant to the possessor of it, is not of itself absolutely and in all respects good, but always pre-supposes morally right behaviour as its condition" (Prac. Reason, pp. 206, 207). "Morality is the supreme good (as the first condition of the *summum bonum*), while happiness constitutes its second element, but only in such a way that it is the morally conditioned, but necessary consequence of the former" (p. 215).

<sup>8</sup> "The acting rational being in the world is not the cause of the world and of nature itself. There is not the least ground, therefore, in the moral law for a necessary connexion between morality and proportionate happiness in a being that belongs to the world as part of it and therefore dependent on it, and which for that reason cannot by his will be a cause of this nature, nor by his own power make it thoroughly harmonise, as far as his happiness is concerned, with his practical principles" (Prac. Reason, p. 221).

we may or must believe in or postulate a God as necessary to the "possibility of the *summum bonum*." <sup>9</sup>

It should be attentively observed that Kant assumes the existence of God, not as necessary to the possibility of the whole of the *summum bonum*, but only of one of its two elements, and that the inferior element, namely, happiness. Kant never postulates a God as necessary to the possibility of the "first and principal element" of the *summum bonum*, virtue or morality. More fully it should be noted, that he does not treat God as the author of the community of moral rational agents in the world, or as the supreme object of their moral reverence, or as the producer of moral law, or the inspirer of moral life, or as himself having ordained that virtue shall be accompanied by proportionate happiness, or as having made it a duty to promote the *summum bonum*; that is to say, he does not postulate a God as necessary for any of the greater objects and concerns of morality, but only, or primarily, as the agent of the rather subordinate office of securing for the virtuous the happiness which they think they ought to have. Kant regards man as morally autonomous, as giving moral law to himself and obeying it of himself, as the sole author of his own virtue.<sup>10</sup> To assume that men are dependent upon God for the moral law and

<sup>9</sup> "It was seen to be a duty for us to promote the *summum bonum*; consequently it is not merely allowable but it is a necessity connected with duty as a requisite, that we should pre-suppose the possibility of this *summum bonum*, and as this is possible only on condition of the existence of God, it inseparably connects the supposition of this with duty; that is, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God" (p. 222).

"It is a duty to realize the *summum bonum* to the utmost of our power, therefore it must be possible, consequently it is unavoidable for every rational being in the world to assume what is necessary for its objective possibility. The assumption is as necessary as the moral law, in connexion with which alone it is valid" (p. 242).

"In a mere course of nature in the world an accurate correspondence between happiness and moral worth is not to be expected, and must be regarded as impossible, and therefore the possibility of the *summum bonum* cannot be admitted from this side except on the supposition of a moral Author of the world" (p. 243).

<sup>10</sup> "What man is or ought to be in a moral sense he must make or must have made himself." "Duty commands nothing that is not practicable to us" (Theory of Religion (Abbott), p. 352 and p. 356).

for virtue would be postulating a species of heteronomy to which Kant is always decidedly opposed. He will not accept moral law even from God; he firmly claims autonomy. The supreme moral object for men is the moral law, which they produce of themselves and impose upon themselves.<sup>11</sup> In his moral theory the finite rational agent is really greater than God, for he performs a higher order of work. To produce moral law and moral character, to decree happiness, to ordain the *summum bonum*, are functions far superior to that of merely providing the inferior constituent of the *summum bonum*, happiness, by manipulating physical nature. Besides, it would seem that the agent who can perform these paramount functions ought to be able to procure the happiness he decrees for himself, without any aid or interposition at all of a God or moral necessity for postulating his existence. To attribute to man the whole power to acquire the "supreme good"—morality—and to deny him the power to acquire the inferior good—the appropriate happiness—is discordant and arbitrary. It is therefore quite evident that Kant's moral theology has in fact a very narrow connection with morality. The God he assumes has little to do with what is supreme in morality; his moral importance is comparatively inconsiderable. As far as our investigation has gone, we seem to be justified even in the conclusion that Kant's moral theistic proof is one of the most oddly conceived and frail arguments ever offered by philosopher for the existence of God or for belief in

<sup>11</sup> It is not meant that "it is necessary to suppose the existence of God as a basis of all obligation in general (for this rests, as has been sufficiently proved, simply on the autonomy of reason itself)" (Prac. Reason, p. 222).

Autonomy of the will "is the supreme principle of morality" (p. 59).

"Ethical legislation cannot be external (not even that of a divine will)" (p. 275).

Kant is expressly opposed to introducing "an external arbitrary legislation of a Supreme Being in place of an internal necessary legislation of Reason" (Critique of Judgement (Bernard tr.), p. 394). He says further: "Laws which Reason itself does not give and whose observance it does not bring about as a pure practical faculty, cannot be moral" (p. 423).



God. Praise has been lavished upon it by some who have not studied it enough to ascertain what it really is and how intrinsically poor it is.

Let us go on to consider one or two significant features of Kant's doctrine not yet sufficiently dwelt upon; namely, the real character of the faith in God, or apprehension of him, which we have by the practical reason; and the real nature of the primacy assigned to the practical reason over the theoretical in theology.

This faith or apprehension is not real knowledge at all. It effects not the least increase of the knowledge we have by the theoretical reason; it leads us not a step out of the total ignorance of the theoretical reason regarding the objective reality of God. All that the practical reason accomplishes in theology beyond the theoretical, is to encourage us to think, hope, and act as if there were an objective God corresponding to the necessary idea of God produced by the theoretical reason; a God who is willing, and as the author and governor of nature is able, to do for us what we cannot do for ourselves, that is, to make the connection between virtue and happiness sure, and in that manner and so far support the interests of morality — of morality which is supposed to be otherwise, or in its main constituents, altogether independent of him. Therefore the God, or the theistic ideal, of practical reason has only a "practical application," serves only a "practical use," "practical purposes." Practical reason has no proof, and can make no permissible presumption, of a real objective God.

These and other fundamental positions of Kant enable us to discern the real character of the alleged primacy of the practical reason over the speculative in religion. The practical has no "insight" respecting the existence and nature of God penetrating deeper than that of the speculative; it must not presume to "contradict" the latter (*Prac. Reason*, p. 216); and effects not the slightest

enlargement of its knowledge, or reduction of its ignorance, of the objective being of God (p. 234); but only urges to a practical application of the idea of God.<sup>12</sup> It would then appear that in fact the primacy ascribed by Kant to the practical reason amounts to very little, is indeed quite insignificant. Besides, practical purposes that do not concern themselves with known realities cannot in their turn be worthy of much concern. The real truth is that instead of giving primacy to the practical over the speculative reason, Kant always in effect places practical reason in subordination to the speculative.

It is a noticeable practice of Kant to make express claims for his practical theism far beyond what it warrants. The theory is to that extent one of unsustained pretensions and promises. For instance, he says: Faith of pure practical reason in God

"can never be reduced to unbelief" (*Prac. Reason*, p. 244). The existence of God is one of those ideas "the possibility of which no human intelligence will ever fathom, but the truth of which, on the other hand, no sophistry will ever wrest from the conviction even of the commonest man" (p. 231). "A want or requirement of pure reason in its speculative use leads only to a *hypothesis*; that of pure practical reason to a *postulate*" (p. 240). "This moral theology has this peculiar advantage over speculative theology, that it leads inevitably to the concept of a *sole, most perfect, and rational* first Being" (*Pure Reason*, p. 653). "What I really mean is, that the belief in a God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral sentiment that, as there is little danger of my losing the latter, there is quite as little fear lest I should ever be deprived of the former" (p. 665).

It does not seem it should be hard to shake faith in an unknown God who is assumed as a necessary cause only to procure the happiness the finite agent has of

<sup>12</sup> "The word 'belief' refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me, and to its subjective influence on the conduct of my reason, which makes me hold it fast, though I may not be able to give an account of it from a speculative point of view" (*Pure Reason*, p. 663).

himself decreed as a reward for his entirely self-acquired virtue. God is indeed postulated for a purpose; but not as a necessary cause of anything of foremost importance in morality — the moral law, virtue, the sense of duty, for these we obtain of ourselves, without God; but only of happiness, the inferior element of the *summum bonum* and conditioned by the superior element, virtue; which is not necessary like virtue, and which men, in their rapture of regard and devotion to the moral law, might possibly get along without and surrender the postulate of the necessity of a God. Again, faith in God is here represented as being thoroughly “interwoven” with our “moral sentiment” and of as certain tenure. But according to Kant’s main teaching, this faith is really very slightly and imperfectly interwoven with our moral sentiment, or moral thought and feeling. God is conceived as having no relation at all to the production and necessary sustentation of moral law and duty. Our own practical reason is held to originate moral law and all sense of obligation quite independently of the existence of God. In this conception, faith in God is not interwoven with anything of primary significance in our moral experience and welfare. Obviously then, according to Kant’s central and indisputable didactic, as remarked before, belief in God has a rather dubious moral connection and foundation. His enthusiastic assumptions as to its tenacity and perpetuity have but little justification. The belief is not justly assimilable, as to strength and endurance, to the conviction of duty which is produced directly within, by our own practical reason in entire independence of the agency of God, and seemingly might much more easily be lost. If he had contended that a God must be assumed as the cause of the kingdom of moral agents and of moral law, as a divine helper for moral living and attainment of moral worth (the chief constituent of the *summum bonum*), as well as the provider of corre-

sponding happiness, the belief in God would have had real moral importance reckoned to it; and much passionate assurance might naturally have been felt and expressed. To many, as it seems, Kant's argument has appeared the more plausible because they have not attentively noted how little, according to its capital positions, God has to do with morality; and often his readers have helped his argument out by their own strong moral predilections and prepossessions. There is much to substantiate the general judgment that so far as Kant felt the assurance expressed in the above citations, it had its real occasion in his speculative reason, and was confusedly and mistakingly ascribed to his practical reason.

The logical and final conclusion of Kant's moral theology amounts only to this: that we must assume a God practically, as the necessary procurer of happiness for the autonomously virtuous, while at the same time we are conscious that we have not the least ground for an intellectual knowledge of God as an objective reality. Practical reason gives us no real or scientific knowledge of God, it provides no means or method of bridging the gulf between the internal idea we possess from speculative reason and a corresponding being; it only encourages a sort of mystic faith in his existence. What Kant says in speaking of speculative theology is found to be the utmost that can be truthfully said of the practical: "Thus we are led to say, for instance, that the things of the world must be considered *as if* they owed their existence to some supreme intelligence; and the idea is thus a heuristic only, not an ostensive concept, showing us not how an object is really constituted, but how we, under the guidance of that concept, should look for the constitution and connection of the objects of experience in general" (*Pure Reason*, p. 539). The belief of the practical theology in God comes in the end to be but little if anything more than just a readiness to act, and



to trust for happiness, *as if there were* a Supreme Being of wisdom presiding over nature, of whom we have no knowledge. This result is very meagre in itself; certainly it is very meagre for so much theologizing, and quite unsatisfactory. In brief, Kant's moral theology is an hypothesis of large promises but of very disappointing fulfilment.

Several of the fundamental principles or postulates of Kant's theology, of which the conclusions of his practical theology just considered are the outcome, deserve a somewhat more extended notice than we have yet given them. *First*, Kant contends that by reason we possess a "primitive" and "necessary" idea of God; that the idea is entirely produced by reason without borrowing anything from the senses or understanding, and without receiving help from any source or without subjection to control because of relation to anything. The postulation of an idea of this character is of very questionable warrant. We have, no doubt, an idea of God as the author and ruler of the world; but the idea cannot be called "necessary," in the sense that it is produced by reason as if acting under an *a priori* compulsion; nor "primitive," in the sense that it is produced at once full-formed, by the momentary creative action of reason and without a process of intellection. Further, there is no adequate evidence that the idea of God is produced by any faculty of mind acting in entire freedom from external influence. This idea seems to owe much to the operations of external things upon the mind, and not to owe all to the independent, wholly unaffected production of reason. And the great strength of the conviction of God's existence seems not to be *a priori* but rather experiential, dependent upon the frequency of external occasions.

It was a confident assumption of Kant that there is no sure passage from the internal idea to an external object, or that the conviction that the idea of God has objective

validity is a scholastic illusion. He says in respect to the idea of God: "The conditions of the objective validity of my concepts are excluded by the idea itself" (*Pure Reason*, p. 543); and goes on to assert that we are altogether without authority to affirm the existence of a being merely from the possession of the conception of such a being. He holds that there cannot be a cognition of an external reality as it is in itself, "considering that we always depend on representations which are inside us" (p. 307).

We must grant that there cannot be an immediate knowledge or consciousness of a reality distinct from us or outside; for such knowledge never goes beyond our ideas or representations — of God or any species of external reality; for our immediate knowledge or consciousness is restricted by the most rigid determination to the affections and the confines of the self. If all our knowledge or all our experience were only immediate, then it would follow inevitably that we could have no experience of anything but our self and our ideas; we could know nothing of anything severed from us, certainly nothing of anything as it exists in itself. We should be compelled to submit to the idealistic conclusions of Kant. But we are not under logical compulsion to give up the possibility of a true mediate or representative knowledge of an external object through an idea as formed under the influence of the object. Every idea is wholly mental and produced by the mind; but the mind is still much affected by objects in forming its ideas of them. The particular attributes of objects occasion the mind to give particular attributes to its ideas. In this manner it may come about that ideas of realities outside the sphere of immediate experience, animate and inanimate, small and great, including our idea of God, which are themselves wholly within immediate experience, being pure modes of mind or self, shall be not only bare ideas but ideas in

which we have a cognitive hold upon the relative or corresponding external objects.

*Secondly*, it is fundamental with Kant and many moralists influenced by him, that the knowledge of the moral law or obligation, or the "categorical imperative," precedes and occasions the knowledge of God, and that the knowledge of God does not precede the knowledge of the moral law. Here again is an assumption of very doubtful validity. It is indeed the very heart of Kant's theology; but it is open to grave question. There is good ground for believing in the reverse order of events.

Respecting the primitive production by reason of the moral law, it is important to conceive and define precisely what is meant by moral law. Some mean by moral law or the categorical imperative, a norm, precept, statute for action, as the Golden Rule, or Kant's modification of it: "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (*Prac. Reason*, p. 38). Others mean by moral law the imperative feeling of duty or oughtness. Kant seems to use "moral law" and "categorical imperative" in both these senses, without precise discrimination. The two modes of law subsist in the closest association; the moral feeling always enforces the moral statute; but they are yet distinct in their character and origin. The one is subjective, the other objective.

Moral law as norm or statute for conduct we certainly come to possess with the clearest cognition; but it cannot be properly supposed to be a natural and necessary production of our reason. It cannot be assumed to be the *a priori* deliverance of reason uninfluenced by the observation of the facts and conditions of our life and by intellectual incubation.

Moral law taken as feeling, the feeling of duty or oughtness, is quite different from the moral precept and from the intellectual process by which the latter seems to

be apprehended. This feeling belongs to the emotional nature. It is to be regarded as a special and original variety of emotional experience, a new "variation," and not as just derived from or compounded of sensations or other modes of feeling, as those of fear, sympathy, retaliation. It is an original part of the matter of experience supplied by the "inner sense." The feeling enters into a peculiarly close alliance with moral precepts, becoming an immediate enforcing power.

The relation of the moral feeling to our knowledge of God or faith in his existence is a particular matter of our present consideration. In respect to this, Kant seems to mistake very seriously. He reverses the true succession of events. The faith in God, instead of following the rise of the moral feeling, really foreruns and occasions it. The history of the primitive races and conditions of men and their progress to full development, does not prove that the moral feeling preceded belief in the Supreme Being, but rather that some degree of belief in the Supreme Being or the gods preceded the moral feeling; and in its own development in clearness, purity, and fullness, leads the feeling in a parallel development in purity and strength. Antecedent faith or knowledge does not generate the moral feeling; but it appears to have been always an important or indispensable occasion for the wakening and evolution of the feeling existing before as an original emotion potentiality.

*Thirdly*, Kant and many others assume that it is altogether feasible for men to act with practical purposes and enduring satisfaction as if there were a God, while disclaiming all real knowledge of him as an objective being; to act upon value-judgments in the entire lack of genuine reality-judgments. They presume impossibilities. Men cannot be permanently content to ascribe high value for any purposes to mere appearances or illusions. They cannot practise for long such a mode of self-deception.



They will be satisfied only with obligations and purposes that have relation to known reality.

There is no disputing the great attention we give to things and our eager pursuit of them and strong conviction of their reality, because they serve our purposes, wishes, uses, and contribute to our gratification; but these facts should not lead us to ignore or depreciate the fact of our perception of things as possessing a real permanent existence and definite character in themselves apart from and altogether independently of us. Our judgments of their discrete being and qualities are as certain as our judgments of their value. The two modes of judgment may rarely or never be sharply severed, because of the near relation of things to us in the same world, and their constant effect upon our welfare; nevertheless, they are in themselves most evidently distinct, and demand recognition as such. The votaries of practical reason generally greatly undervalue the importance of the intellectual perception of realities and their external existence independent of our cognition and of our purposes and desires. Though their importance for us is chiefly in their utility, yet things have as certain being and properties as have we ourselves with our aims, wishes, interests. We have the benefits of, but we do not make, their reality. It is a hollow peace that was arranged by Kant between the theoretical reason and the practical reason, according to which we are to be satisfied to act as if there were a God, while we are still conscious that we have not the least theoretical or scientific knowledge of him.

## BOOK REVIEWS

BAHAISM AND ITS CLAIMS. SAMUEL GRAHAM WILSON, D.D. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1915. Pp. 298.

The author of this volume was for more than thirty years a missionary and principal of a school in Tabriz, where he was in close communication with Persian Bahais — his language teachers were of the sect — and where he enjoyed the acquaintance of the French consul, M. Nicolas, the biographer of the Bab and translator of the Babi Scriptures. He has also had in his possession a manuscript life of Baha Allah, by Mohammed Javad Kasvini, which does not appear, however, to have furnished much information not previously accessible to Western scholars. For the history of the movement from the Bagdad period on, Dr. Wilson has drawn chiefly from Browne; the Western stage of the development of Bahaism is set forth more fully, chiefly from American publications by Oriental and American authors. His reading in these sources has been comprehensive, and he has made profitable use of the periodical issued every nineteen days at Chicago, at first under the title *Bahai News*, subsequently as *The Star of the West*.

Two chapters are given to setting forth the claims of Bahaism. The world is in need of a new and universal religion based on divine revelation, and Bahaism is this religion. The first of the three fundamental dogmas of Bahaism is the deity of Baha Allah, who is, in his own words, "the locus of God's essence in the world of the word and the creation." The term "incarnation" (*ḥulūl*) is avoided, having long since been put under the ban of heresy as a doctrine of some of the extravagant Sufis; "Manifestation" is the technical term of the ultra-Shiites, and is consequently adopted by the Babis and Bahais. What is meant, however, is made clear by the words of one of the missionaries sent to America to heal the dissensions in the order: "Upon the day when God Almighty, in the form of man known as Baha Ullah, declared himself, and said, 'I am God, and there is no God but me,' the old heavens and old earth passed away; all things became new."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "I am God, and there is no other God but me," comes from a well-known verse of one of the greatest of the Sufi poets, Bayazid, with whom it has an altogether different sense. The Bab appears to have appropriated the word for himself in a distorted meaning.

The second dogma is the absolute authority (and, for the present age, finality) of the revelation made in and by Baha Allah, and consequently the obligation of submission and unconditional obedience to his commands. These two dogmas, as Baha Allah himself says, are inseparable: "Man cannot take one, without the other." The third dogma is the exclusive authority of Abd ul-Baha as expositor and interpreter of the revelation and commandments of Baha. After the death of Abd ul-Baha, this authority will pass to a kind of supreme council, the "House of Justice," whose decisions will be infallible. Immediately after the death of Baha Allah a schism occurred over the succession, his other sons not being disposed to concede this supreme and sole authority to Abd ul-Baha (Abbas Effendi).

Of less consequence than these fundamental dogmas are the extravagant claims of Bahais concerning the originality and value of their revelations. According to some of them, Baha Allah was the first to conceive the idea of universal and permanent peace among the nations, of the harmony of religions, the equality of women with men — most of which have only that kind of originality which comes from an ignorance of the history of human thought.

The relations of Bahaism and Christianity are discussed in the two following chapters. The efforts of Bahais were early directed to proving that in Baha Allah were fulfilled, not only the expectations of the Imam Mahdi, who according to the Shia Moslems is to "fill the earth with righteousness as now it is filled with injustice," and among the extreme sects, with whom the Bahais are connected, is the latest "Manifestation" of the godhead in human form, but of the prophecies of the coming deliverer (Messiah) in the Jewish Scriptures and of the return of Christ in the New Testament. As Dr. Wilson significantly says, the missionaries had put these weapons into their hands by a Persian translation of Keith, *On Prophecy*. It must be remembered, however, that apocalyptic arithmetic had been cultivated independently and abundantly by Shia Moslems themselves, on the basis of Koran and tradition; and the calculations of the date of the appearance of the Bab in 1844, or the manifestation of Baha in 1863, based on the 2,300 days in Daniel 8 14, or the 1,290 days in Daniel 12 11, are intrinsically neither better nor worse than computations of the coming of Christ or the end of the world from the same data by similar processes.

In the syncretistic stage of Bahaism, which began at Acca, and in the missionary propaganda adapted to peoples of Christian education, there has been an extensive accommodation to the language

of Scripture and Christian phraseology, and an effort to present Bahaism as the consummation and fulfilment of Christianity. This has been accompanied by a free use of the religious principle of dissimulation, which has played so large a part in the history of Shia Mohammedanism, and has had such a mischievous effect on Persian character. The Ismailis, the Druses, the Ali Ilahis are earlier examples of sects which were all things to all men, and which allowed their adherents to profess Judaism, Christianity, or orthodox Islam — or all of them — according to circumstances, precisely as the Bahais permit or recommend their converts to be professing Christians, or to remain in the Jewish synagogue, or the Zoroastrian faith. The revelation of Baha Allah succeeded and superseded all that went before it — the Old Testament and the New, the Koran, the Beyan of the Bab — as each succeeding Manifestation is superior to his predecessors. This position resembles that of orthodox Islam toward the Jewish and Christian Scriptures.

Bahaism is in its ideal and intention a state, a theocracy. Its constitution and its laws — civil, criminal, and ritual — are embodied in a book of infallible authority, in which no change can be made before the coming of the next Manifestation, which Baha Allah declared would not be for at least a thousand years. This conception of the theocratic state and its divine law are taken over without the slightest modification from Shia Mohammedanism. The organs of the theocracy in this system are the Imams. During the period of occultation, when the Imam of the Age is concealed, the world is governed for better or for worse — chiefly worse — by political rulers, but when the Imam Mahdi appears, he will claim the sovereignty and the possession of the earth by divine right. The Bab openly made this claim, and the Babi rebellions against the Shah were, in the eyes of his followers, the beginning of the holy war by which the earth should be subdued beneath the rule of the Imam. Baha Allah, more wisely, disavowed the intention or expectation of establishing the reign of righteousness on earth by the sword — the universality of the true religion is to be achieved by the conversion of the peoples of the earth; but the goal to be thus achieved is, none the less, a theocracy. The best form of the state, as it appears in Baha's writings for Western readers, at least, is a constitutional monarchy. In the fundamental revelation, it does not appear, however, what functions are left to the monarch, constitutional or otherwise. The government is in the hands of "Houses of Justice," each consisting of nine or more Bahai men. There are local councils of this kind, and above them a national council. They are to be guided in all



things by the revelation which is in their hands — a kind of Sanhedrin, we may imagine. Finally, according to Abd ul-Baha, a universal "House of Justice" shall be organized. "That which it orders shall be the truth in explaining the commands of Baha Allah, and shall be obeyed by all. All men shall be under its supervision." National disputes will be settled by this tribunal, and, "if any nation dares to refuse to abide by the decision of the international court, all the other nations must arise and put down this rebellion. . . . They must rise up and destroy it, . . . band together and exterminate it." The resemblance of this plan to some of the most recent plans for securing the peace of the world by force of arms is obvious; the difference, however, is that this supreme arbitrament lies in the hands of a religious court.

A good deal has been made, in Occidental propaganda, of the equality of men and women in Bahaism. Abd ul-Baha created some amusement in a discourse in England on the equality of the sexes by remarking that "in the animal kingdom the male and the female enjoy suffrage; in the vegetable kingdom the flowers all enjoy equal suffrage; in the human kingdom the male and the female are equal before God; divine justice demands that men and women have equal rights." If we turn, however, to the revelation itself, we find polygamy intrenched in the sacred law. The Koran allows a man four wives at once, the Kitab Akdas of Baha Allah reduces the number to two — concubines do not count. As Dr. Wilson observes, the equality here seems to be one-sided, in as much as the corresponding right to have two husbands at a time is not extended to women. Baha Allah himself left families by three women, all of whom survived him. The power of divorce rests in the hands of the man, as it does in Moslem law, with only the restriction that if a man quarrels with his wife and wants to divorce her, he shall allow a year's time to elapse for a possible reconciliation. Marriage by contract for a fixed term (*Mut'a*), which is allowed by Shia law but not in orthodox Islam, was abolished by Baha Allah. Adultery is punished by a moderate fine, which is doubled for the second offence; but it does not appear that a woman can be released from the marriage bond because of the adultery of her husband.

Some of the American female Bahais, as is not unnatural, were perplexed that, with all the equality which Abd ul-Baha talked about, women were not allowed to be members of the Houses of Justice, either local or national; but they had to be content with the mild reproof, "The maid-servants of the Merciful should not interfere with the affairs which have to do with the Board of Consultation, or House of Justice."

In the following chapters (8-11), Dr. Wilson discusses at some length the Bahai claims to moral superiority over the rest of mankind. He tells over in detail the unsavory story of the period at Adrianople and Acca, the quarrels of the brothers Subh-i-Azal and Baha Allah, the mutual accusations of poison plots, the numerous assassinations, and the contentions among the sons of Baha Allah for the headship in the community after his death. The volume closes with a sketch of Bahaism in America and its present state.

That Bahaism has done some good in Persia, where alone it has a following numerous enough to measure results upon, Dr. Wilson would probably not deny, but the millennial conditions so glowingly depicted by some American pilgrims to the East have not come under his observation. The reputation of the Bahais for truthfulness, honesty, peaceableness, charity, and sobriety is neither better nor worse than that of their Shia countrymen. In the recent movements for political and social reform, which had so pathetic an outcome, the Bahais were not the leaders; by instruction, they prudently stood aloof. And, in fact, it would be a good deal easier for the Mullahs of the Persian state religion to accommodate themselves to liberal institutions than for those who have a brand new and unchangeable law-book on their hands.

Toward the Bahai missions in Europe and America, Dr. Wilson feels as a long-time Christian missionary in Persia might be expected to feel, and he would probably regard it as "Taḳiyya" (religious dissimulation) to disguise his sentiments, but his antipathy does not betray him into misrepresentation of the facts, for which, indeed, he quotes the authorities most approved among the Bahais, in their own words. The reader will therefore find in this volume an unsympathetic, but, so far as it goes, a trustworthy account of the movement.

The chief defect of the book is that it does not explain the origin of the religion, with what to the uninitiated reader might seem to be its distinctive or original ideas. How, for example, did Baha Allah take it into his head that he was God manifest in the flesh? And how did he find so many men prepared to take him at his word? How did the idea of the universality of the religion arise? The answer to such questions lies in the history of Shia Mohammedanism, with its doctrine of the infallible Imam, the Imam Mahdi, who is to come and establish the universal reign of truth and righteousness on earth, and the belief of the ultra-Shia sects that this Imam Mahdi is a Manifestation of the eternal godhead in human form. From the same source comes the doctrine of successive Manifestations, each

more complete than its predecessors, each with its fuller revelation of the Truth, and of the necessity of an authoritative personal guide. Bahaiism is intelligible from its own premises, and entitled to the respect which every great and coherent system of religious thought commands. Men brought up in these ideas and beliefs were predisposed to recognize, first in the Bab and then in Baha Allah, the fulfilment of immemorial hopes and expectations, which are, in their way, parallel to the Messianic beliefs of Jews and Christians, and to the expectation of the Mahdi in orthodox Islam; and as in these religions, the expectation has produced its fulfilment. The nearest analogies to Bahaiism, however, are to be found in the Ismailis and the Druses. Bahaiism is not essentially a new religion, except in the sense that it recognizes the Manifestation in a different individual.

The student of the Bahai movement will also recognize in it an increasingly potent Sufi strain. Sufi influence is evident in the Bab himself. It was strong in Subh-i-Azal, the younger brother of Baha, whom the Bab named as his successor, and it appears in all the Oriental representatives of Bahaiism in larger or smaller measure; it sometimes goes to the length, as I have pointed out above, of the appropriation of famous passages of the Persian mystical poets.

It is to be regretted, also, that Dr. Wilson did not make larger use of the most important of all the Bahai Scriptures, the *Kitab Akdas*, the "Most Holy Book," which, with the *Respona* appended to it, is the fundamental religious law of the Oriental Bahais. He has quoted occasionally from a summary of this work by Browne in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, and has looked into a manuscript translation of it by Kheirallah, but apparently is not aware that the work has been printed and is accessible to Orientalists. On page 38 f., he quotes from the opening sentences of the *Kitab Akdas*:<sup>1</sup> "Whoever lays hold of him, lays hold of all good, and he who denies is lost, even though he bring all good works." The essential dogmatism and legalism of the religion are here most unqualifiedly avowed.

Although Dr. Wilson does not bring out this character in as strong relief as he might have done, he fully recognizes it, as no one in the least acquainted with the history or the texts could fail to do; and

<sup>1</sup> There is no indication of the source of this translation; but by the omission of the most significant clauses, and by a translation which takes the pith out of the trenchant sentences, the high claims of Baha Allah are reduced to being the dawning place of the revelation — which to Occidental ears sounds harmless enough — and the teeth of the dogma that there is no salvation except by belief in him and obedience to him are drawn.

the book will therefore serve as a wholesome corrective to such misconceptions as those into which Mr. Vail has fallen in his article on Bahaism in this REVIEW (July, 1914). Bahaism is a religion—an Oriental religion—of a perfectly well-known type, and has a right to demand that it shall be appreciated and treated as such, and not as a farrago of platitudinous oracles on elementary morals, or the shreds and patches of Persian mysticism.

Dr. Wilson would have been well-advised to have the proof read by some one more familiar with the fashions of transliterating Arabic and Persian words in English. "Madh Ulya" (repeatedly) is perhaps an awkward misprint, but "*Akstag fur Allah!* God forbid!" (p. 188) is a good deal to make the compositor the scapegoat for. It takes some imagination to recognize old acquaintances in the list of would-be founders of religions on page 19. There are some other slips: Montanus (p. 12) is in strange company with Manes and Mazdak. The quotation (p. 89), "I was a hid treasure, I desired to be known, therefore I created the world," is not from the Koran; it is one of the innumerable spurious "traditions of the Prophet" by which the Sufis gave semblance of authority to their speculations. These are minor matters; in essential things the book seems to be accurate enough.

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THE HEART OF JAINISM. MRS. SINCLAIR STEVENSON. Oxford University Press. 1915. Pp. xxiv. 336. 7s. 6d.

It is a rather surprising fact that an age so full of interest in every kind of religion and at the same time so well equipped with competent investigators as is ours, should have paid but scant attention to one of the oldest religions of the world, and one which in many points is quite unique. This Western lack of interest in Jainism is due in part to the fact that until thirty years ago it was considered merely an offshoot of Buddhism, in part to the inaccessibility of much of its ancient literature, and in part perhaps to the bad name given it by Professor Hopkins in his very influential book, *The Religions of India*; in which he caricatures Jainism as "a religion in which the chief points insisted on are that one should deny God, worship man, and nourish vermin." In the latter part of the last century, however, the attention of a few scholars began to turn toward Jainism, and Professors Jacobi and Bühler in particular made a beginning toward emancipating it at the same time from Buddhism and from



obscurity; so that with the present century the religion of Mahavira has begun to receive some degree of popular recognition. Several little books concerning it have appeared in the last fifteen years — the most valuable of them being probably Mrs. Stevenson's *Notes on Modern Jainism*, written in 1910. Up to the publication of the book under review, however, we have had no thorough and systematic treatise upon the subject; and every student of Jainism for years to come will find it necessary to refer repeatedly to *The Heart of Jainism*.

For there is no other work in which one can find the history, the doctrines, and the present customs and conditions of Jainism expounded with thoroughness and in detail. And certainly few other scholars would be able to do what Mrs. Stevenson has done. For she combines with the knowledge of the ancient sources an intimate acquaintance with present-day Jainas and their Gujarati writings. For eight years, as a missionary in Kathiawar (the centre of Jainism,) she has had almost unequalled opportunities to know the men and women of whom she writes, observe their customs, and understand their feelings.

Jainism, as has been pointed out, is one of the oldest religions in the world. In fact, all the Jainas stoutly maintain that it is absolutely the oldest, and that it was founded by the first of their twenty-four Tirthankaras, "Lord Adinath" by name, who lived 100,000,000,000,000 *palya* ago. That this makes the Jaina religion decidedly venerable will be admitted when we realize that a *palya* is the length of time it would take to empty a well a mile square stuffed full of fine hairs, if one hair were removed every century. Needless to say, Western criticism has never accepted the historicity of Lord Adinath; and in fact for a long time refused to recognize even Mahavira, the last of the Tirthankaras, as a historical character. Mahavira's historicity, however, has been for some years well established; and Mrs. Stevenson in the book under review agrees with Dr. Jacobi in going one step further with the Jainas, and admitting that Parsvanatha also, the Tirthankara immediately preceding Mahavira on the list, was probably historical. Mahavira — the elder contemporary of Buddha — was thus not the founder of Jainism but the reformer of a sect already in existence. The few trustworthy facts of his life are woven together in Chapter III into a surprisingly presentable biography; while in Chapters II, IV, and V we have a historical account of the Jaina community from the earliest times to the present. This is followed by an elaborate and scholarly exposition of the Jaina metaphysics and ethics; and the book is concluded by a

number of excellent chapters on the Jainism of today as it affects the life of monk and layman.

Mrs. Stevenson is a missionary, and she believes that Jainism is bound some day to yield absolutely to Christianity. This, however, does not prevent her from bringing to her study of the religion which she seeks to destroy a very considerable sympathy; and though the reader is constantly reminded that the author is a missionary, he also feels that there is little prejudice and a great deal of real appreciation involved in her account. In one respect only is the book a disappointment — namely, in its failure to make any mention of the very interesting campaign of reform and revival which forms the centre of discussion in the Jaina community today. Groups of young Jaina idealists have been formed in various parts of India, organizations have been founded, periodicals published, and schools established with the aim of abolishing various ancient evils and bringing Jainism “up to date.” Of all this one gleans no hint in Mrs. Stevenson’s book. It is, of course, likely enough that this movement is but a passing episode in the story of a religion now over 2,500 years old; and the steady decrease in the Jaina community — which, all told, numbers but a million and a quarter — does not promise brilliantly for its future. But it is just possible that the future historian of Jainism will point out that Mrs. Stevenson, with all her insight, left unnoticed one of the turning-points of Jaina history, and one which lay before her very eyes.

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A HISTORY OF BABYLON FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE MONARCHY TO THE PERSIAN CONQUEST. LEONARD W. KING. F. A. Stokes Co. 1915. Pp. xxiv, 340.

The present volume is the second of a comprehensive work on Babylonian and Assyrian history of which the *History of Sumer and Akkad* was the first. Mr. King has used most successfully the new material which has come to light, especially within the past half-decade, from recently acquired tablets and from excavations chiefly of the city of Babylon. As Assistant Keeper of Egyptian and Assyrian antiquities in the British Museum, he has had a large share in the publication of those records upon an intimate knowledge of which his history is based.

In the preface the author points out that the most striking fact about Babylon’s history is the continuity of her culture during the

whole of the dynastic period, the principal modification having been in the system of land-tenure. From the list of persons to whom acknowledgment of indebtedness is made the reader misses the name of Dr. Koldewey.

After an introductory chapter on Babylon's place in the history of antiquity, in which he points out that the continued preëminence of a single city for over fifteen hundred years was founded upon natural conditions and their resultant economic conditions, he passes to an account of the excavation of Babylon by the Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft. Mr. King spent some time at Babylon in 1901, and although the plans used in this chapter are taken from Dr. Koldewey's *Das wiedererstehende Babylon*, the chapter is not a mere restatement of Koldewey's book, but is an account based upon his own personal observation and interpretation of the texts. In two important particulars Mr. King differs from the excavator, namely, in regard to the identification of the city walls and the famous Hanging Gardens of Nebuchadnezzar. Perhaps both points can be settled only by further excavation. The vaulted chambers upon which the Hanging Gardens are supposed to have rested seem to have been used for storing grain. The criticism that they could not have been kept free from moisture if the space above them was a garden is not convincing, when one considers the very extensive use made of asphalt, and the fact that the plan shows an air space between the chamber walls and the strong surrounding wall.

The chapter on chronology contains Mr. King's most important contribution to our knowledge of the period. He points out that the most serious defect from which Babylonian chronology has suffered, is the complete absence of any established point of contact between the Babylonian dynasties and the earlier dynasties of Nisin and Larsa. This connecting link has been established by Mr. King, thanks to his ingenious use of a complete list of Larsa kings and other material recovered by Professor Clay for the Yale Collection, a transcription of which was placed at Mr. King's disposal before Professor Clay's work was through the press. Such courtesy cannot be too highly commended, as the material from the Yale Collection furnished the *sine qua non* for the new chronology. The list of Larsa kings accredits Rim-Sin with a reign of sixty-one years, followed by Hammurabi and Samsuiluna, in the tenth year of whose reign Rim-Sin was actively leading a revolt against the Babylonian ruler. Mr. King produces evidence to prove that Rim-Sin put an end to the dynasty of Nisin in his seventeenth year, which fact establishes the desired point of contact between the dynasties of Babylon, Larsa,

and Nisin, but it also raises the question of the probability of Rim-Sin being an active political force in the eighty-third year of his reign. Mr. King assumes, as we think correctly, that a mistake in a contemporary document is unlikely. The explanation that Rim-Sin was retained as a vassal and that the sixty-one years include the period both of his independent and dependent rule, that the scribe mechanically added up the column of figures without deducting from the total the years of Rim-Sin's dependent rule, is likely to commend itself to those whose experience in dealing with Babylonian records makes them most competent to judge. The two defeats of Nisin by Sin-muballit and Hammurabi are therefore, contrary to the usually accepted opinion, to be regarded as temporary successes, which preceded Rim-Sin's capture of Nisin.

Another chronological difficulty that has taxed the ingenuity of scholars is in regard to the relation of the second dynasty of Babylon to the first and third. To Mr. King is due the generally accepted belief that the kings of the second dynasty never occupied the throne of Babylon. We must commend Mr. King's open-mindedness in changing his views when evidence requires it. He is now in a position to prove the rule of the Sea-Country kings over southern and central Babylonia, and the incorporation of the Sea-Country kings in the Babylonian dynastic history he regards as a weighty argument for believing some of them to have ruled in Babylon. Dr. Kugler's astronomical method of arriving at the date of the first dynasty and the references of late Assyrian and Babylonian kings to earlier rulers are shown to confirm the results already attained. These new discoveries do not involve any drastic change in the accepted chronological scheme, but lead to local readjustments and regroupings.

In his discussion of the Western Semites, Mr. King shows that they acquired a civilization in Canaan, which had been in turn considerably influenced by that of the Tigris-Euphrates valley. When they moved eastward along the middle course of the Euphrates River, leaving the Hittite city of Carchemish to the north, they founded the Amoritic kingdom of Khana; then they descended the Euphrates and founded the dynasties of Nisin and Larsa a century before the rise of Babylon. Assyria is also believed to have received its Semitic population at this time as another offshoot of this great racial movement. Assyrian culture is not to be regarded as merely a copy of that of Babylon, for the Assyrians were an amalgamation of an Anatolian (Mitannian) race with the Amurru. The rise of the dynasty of Babylon, the gradual extension of its influence in southern Babylonia,



and the struggle with Elam, are interestingly depicted. The geographical term "Subartu" is regarded as referring to both Ashur and Nineveh, and Hammurabi's occupation of Assyria is believed to have been of a permanent character.

Few scholars who are competent to deal with the material at first hand have the ability to conjure up the past as vividly as Mr. King has done in describing the age of Hammurabi. In dealing with the difficult period of Kassite rule, with its dearth of Babylonian sources, Mr. King has recourse to the Tell-el-Amarna letters and the recently discovered correspondence at Boghaz-Keui, to show that at this time Babylon stood aloof from active participation in the political affairs of Asia Minor, engrossed in commerce, while Egypt dominated Syria; the kingdom of Mitanni acted as a check upon Assyrian expansion; the Hittites acquired a position of power before which Egypt declined and the kingdom of Mitanni fell. The Hittites are regarded as a race indigenous to Asia Minor and probably akin to the Mitannian people, whom our author believes to be totally non-Indo-European. Mr. King agrees with the prevailing opinion that the Kassites were Aryan by race.

To avoid the repetition of what must necessarily be given in the third volume of this series, the period of Assyrian domination has received summary treatment. The devotion of only fourteen pages to the Neo-Babylonian period appears disproportionately small. The statement that "in 586 Jerusalem was once more taken and *the greater part of the remnant of the Jews* [the italics are mine] followed their fellow-countrymen into exile," is an inaccuracy of statement which Mr. King rarely allows himself. The suggested identification of Gubaru, an officer high in command in the army of Nebuchadnezzar with Gobryas, the governor of Gutium, who played so prominent a part in the Persian conquest, furnishes a welcome explanation of the ease with which Babylonian rule was supplanted by Persian domination. Babylon's real decay is shown to have begun only when Seleucus recognized the greater advantages for maritime commerce offered by the river Tigris.

The last chapter is devoted to a discussion of Babylon's cultural influence and is in particular an examination of a theory proposed by the late Professor Winckler, who would make all ancient civilization to a large extent a mere modification of Babylonian culture. For scientific circles the reply to this theory has been definitely given by Professor F. X. Kugler in his *Sterndienst und Sternkunde*, and in greater detail by the same author in his *Im Bannkreis Babels*. Since the influence of this theory extends to a wide circle, it is fitting that

a treatment so just as that of Mr. King should be accessible in English. For the scholar a more fruitful line of research has been opened by such studies as that of Professor H. Zimmern in his *Akkadische Fremdwörter als Zeuger babylonischen Kultureinfluss*.

In a work which describes the fortunes of Babylon during the whole of the dynastic period, there are of necessity several points — chiefly of minor significance — on which the reader might take issue with the author. More evidence is needed to fill in many gaps; there are blanks in our knowledge which in some cases extend over centuries; the rich material offered by the large number of commercial documents has not been utilized for any comprehensive study of economic conditions. In the present state of our knowledge, there is probably no one who could have shown more prudence, cleverness, accuracy of method, and soundness of judgment in the execution of his task. Mr. King's history, both for the general reader and the scholar, is the standard work which even replaces the second edition of Eduard Meyer's *Geschichte des Altertums* in those parts which deal with the overlapping of additional dynasties with the first dynasty of Babylon and the circumstances which led to the rise of Babylon to power.

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PAUL'S DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION. HENRY BEACH CARRÉ, Ph.D. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. xiv, 175. \$1.25.

This essay maintains the thesis that the key to Paul's doctrine of redemption is to be found in a dualistic cosmology. The Apostle thought (Dr. Carré assumes) that the history of the universe is the progress of a struggle between God and the Satanic host. Man has become involved in this conflict by becoming subject to Sin (by which name Paul designates a personal Evil Spirit, Satan's *alter ego*); a subjection brought about by Adam's transgression. As Sin's slave he is allied to God's enemies, and this slavery brings him under the power of another "cosmic foe" of God or "hypostasis of Satan," "Death." God "redeems" man from his slavery to Sin, by making Christ become man and die. In some unexplained way, Christ's death makes it possible for man to get away from the clutch of the Evil Spirit (or cosmic foe of God, or hypostasis of Satan), Sin, and unite his life to that of Christ, and so to the life of God. Men who believe the gospel experience this deliverance or "redemption," and at once begin to take God's part in the "cosmic conflict." On the

Satanic side are the unredeemed men. "Men are still the agents through whom the Chieftains — God and Satan — operate."

Dr. Carré supports his thesis by citing and explaining various classic passages from the Pauline Epistles. An estimate of the success of his contention could not be given without entering into exegetical details to an extent forbidden by the limits of this notice. Perhaps one interpretation may be mentioned as giving the reviewer pause: "While Christ is said to redeem us from the curse of the law, what is really meant is that He has liberated us from the demonic Powers or the cosmic forces of evil, of which one was the Law." It is rather startling to find the Law, which Paul said in Galatians had been "ordained through angels," and had been given to prepare God's sons for the free life in Christ, and in Romans to be "holy, just, and good," classed with evil spirits, the enemies of God.

The decisive question regarding the merits of this essay is not that of the soundness of its exegesis but of the merit of its method. Can we reasonably expect to find one of Paul's leading religious thoughts by first seeking his philosophy, and then, having assumed the quest to be successful, interpreting his religious teaching by it? Have we any better means of knowing the former than the latter? And what right have we to assume that his religious teaching is the consistent development of a philosophy? Can anything but examination of it make us sure that it does not contain incongruous elements? The "proposition" which our author says is one of his guides in his discussion — that "Paul's theology is not distinguishable from his philosophy, and therefore the salient features of his theology, so-called, are rooted in and are one with his world-view" — is apparently drawn from his inner consciousness. To understand what Paul says about sin in Romans 8, should we go to his "cosmic philosophy" or to his experience? And if we take his strong language as the expression of an experience, why read into it a dualistic philosophy of which it bears no trace? Dibelius, on whom our author leans at times heavily, sees that this would be sheer wilfulness, and says that in Romans Paul lays aside his notion that Sin is a demon and treats it as a psychological experience. We must make his complete thought of sin a prime factor in shaping his thought of redemption.

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GREEK AND ROMAN MYTHOLOGY. WILLIAM SHERWOOD FOX. Vol. I of The Mythology of All Races (12 vols.), (Louis Herbert Gray and George Foot Moore, Eds.) Marshall Jones Co.

This comprehensive undertaking naturally opens with the volume before us, in which that mythology which has had most influence on our own intellectual life is well treated. The remaining volumes will be given to the myths of the ancient Teutons, Celts, and Slavs, the Finno-Ugric and Siberian peoples, the Semites, the East Indians and Persians, the Armenians and the Pagan tribes of Africa, the Chinese and Japanese, the Malayo-Polynesian and Australian peoples, the American Indians, the Egyptians, and the peoples of Burma, Siam, and Annam. The whole work is to be made more available by an analytical index. Besides this volume by Professor Fox of Princeton University, there have also appeared the volume (IX) on the myths of the Malayo-Polynesian and Australian peoples, by Professor Dixon of Harvard University, and the two volumes (X and XI) by Professor Alexander of the University of Nebraska, on the mythology of the American Indians.

Mr. Fox knows his subject well, and has given an admirable account of the chief classic myths, so far as the plan of the work allowed him. He writes for the general reader primarily, but this of course does not mean that his work is not scholarly. From the vast amount of material at his disposal he has naturally been obliged to select what has seemed to him most important. In general his selections will meet approval. The present reviewer somewhat regrets that a more limited choice was not made, that a fuller treatment might be given to certain myths; but no doubt others will not share his feeling.

In an introduction Mr. Fox discusses some interesting questions as to the nature and origin of myths, their sanction and persistence. His paragraphs on the nature of Greek religion and the unique character of Greek mythology are well put; likewise what he has to say on the meaning of myths and on their relation to Ethics and to Art will meet the approval of modern scholars. So far as the interpretation of mythology is concerned, our author acknowledges his allegiance in general to the anthropological or comparative method, which English scholars, notably Lang and Frazer, have made so preëminent in the last quarter of a century. The scope of his work prevented Mr. Fox from entering far into the fascinating field of interpretation, but it is useful to have his attitude stated clearly in his introduction.



The main work falls into three sections: I, The Myths of the Beginning, the Heroes, and the After-world; II, The Greek Gods; and III, The Mythology of Ancient Italy. In the first part the myths are given, so far as possible, on the basis of locality—the Peloponnesus, the Northern Mainland, Crete, and Attica. Of the heroes, Herakles and Theseus have each a chapter, while a like assignment is made to the Voyage of the Argo and the Tale of Troy. The Greater Gods receive individual treatment—Zeus and Hera, Athena, Leto, Apollo, Artemis and Hekate, Ares, Hermes, Aphrodite and Eros, Hephaistos and Hestia, Poseidon and Amphitrite, Dionysus, Demeter, Kore, and Hades. The lesser divinities are grouped according to their associations or functions. It seems to the reviewer that the Mythology of Ancient Italy might well have been omitted entirely. The material, so far as native Italian myths are concerned, is very small and of uncertain value; and what the cultivated reader desires is a statement of that Romanized Greek mythology found in the Roman poets and by them passed on to the mediæval and modern world. This Mr. Fox was debarred from giving by the plan of his work; what he has said will scarcely be of great interest to any but the expert, who hardly needs it. If this third section had been omitted, space would have been secured for a fuller discussion of some of the more important Greek myths.

The work is well illustrated with over sixty full-page plates, and with a few pictures in the text. The illustrations are wisely chosen and handsomely reproduced; but, as is quite too often the case in such works, they are frequently placed at some distance from the text with which they belong.

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**HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF BIBLE LANDS.** A Manual for Teachers, with fourteen maps. RICHARD MORSE HODGE, D.D. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915. Pp. vii, 84. \$1.00.

**THE TESTING OF A NATION'S IDEALS.** Israel's History from the Settlement to the Assyrian Period. CHARLES FOSTER KENT, Ph.D., and JEREMIAH WHIPPLE JENKS, Ph.D. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915. Pp. vii, 149.

The *Historical Geography of Bible Lands* provides a course of thirteen lessons (adaptable for children of fourteen or over, or for adults) in the study of geography as a factor in Bible history. It is accompanied by a pupil's Historical Atlas, containing tables, maps, and pictures. The course combines narrative and map work in a series

of imaginary tours starting from the United States and punctuated by historical anecdotes. The stereoscope is an adjunct of the course. "In every chapter . . . places are first to be recognized as parts of the present-day world and then identified as the locations of certain events of Bible history." The arrangement of the Manual is excellent, and its treatment of the subject graphic and in line with modern educational method. The maps, which both explain and are explained by the text, are original and illuminating. The course is highly to be recommended as imparting to the study of Bible history a sense of vividness and reality.

*The Testing of a Nation's Ideals* is planned primarily for college students and adult classes. In twelve compact chapters it shows how the Hebrews, from the time of their settlement in Canaan to the coming of the Assyrian conquerors, underwent a process which put to severe test their inherited political, social, moral, and religious ideals. The following chapter-headings indicate the type of subjects treated: The Necessity of Political Unity; The Need of Breadth and Self-Control in Statesmanship; Culture without Religion; The Fundamental Importance of a Right Financial Policy; The Expression of the Will of the People; A Nation's Destiny. The book is notable for its correlation of parallel readings from a wide variety of sources, ancient and modern. Of the three books (besides a standard work on American history) required "for constant reference" two are by Herbert Croly and A. Lawrence Lowell. Thus the currents of political history and the characteristics of political leaders of Old Testament times are interpreted in the light of similar forces in the modern world.

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"A Society for the publication of Grotius" was recently formed at The Hague, with the object of preparing a new edition of the works of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), the famous Dutch scholar, renowned alike as Lawyer, Theologian, Philosopher, and Historian. A commencement will be made by publishing the letters written by and to Grotius. A committee has been appointed, consisting of the following gentlemen: Prof. Mr. C. van Vollenhoven, Leiden, President; Mr. G. J. Fabius, Rotterdam, Treasurer; Prof. Dr. J. Huizinga, Leiden; Prof. Dr. A. Eekhof, Leiden; Mr. G. Vissering, Amsterdam; Dr. D. F. Scheurleer, The Hague; and Dr. P. C. Molhuysen, The Hague, Secretary.